The general public became aware of the right to be forgotten in May 2014 with the landmark ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) which held that individuals have the right, under certain conditions, to request search engines to remove links containing their personal information. In addition, the General Data Protection Regulation, which includes an explicit provision on the right to be forgotten, was adopted in April 2016. The aim of this thesis is to establish what this right represents, what it means for the protection of privacy and data protection in EU, and in what way will it affect freedom of speech.
The hypothesis is that in the EU the right to be forgotten was recognised by the judgment of the CJEU, which was unexpected. Although the right to be forgotten is an important contribution to the protection of privacy on the Internet, it also creates a conflict between free speech and privacy. Balancing basic rights is left to private companies (controllers) and not to public authorities, which means that a comprehensive assessment of the conflicting rights is not carried out.
The thesis concludes that there are very different interpretations of what the right to be forgotten means and what kind of terminology should be used in describing it. In the EU, the right to be forgotten has been developed through privacy and data protection law. In particular, the CJEU judgment means the interpretation of the existing provisions of secondary legislation and fundamental rights in the EU. Moreover, at the time of the CJEU was reaching its decision, the new data protection regulation, which includes a special provision on the right to be forgotten, had already been in the legislative procedure. The idea of the right to be forgotten was thus not entirely new, nor unexpected. With regard to the relationship between privacy and free speech, this thesis concludes that the conflict undoubtedly exists, but it is still difficult to determine the extent to which this occurs at this point. Finally, the regime under which the task of balancing fundamental human rights is delegated to private profit-seeking undertakings has proven to be particularly problematic. The three-part hypothesis was therefore largely confirmed.
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