This thesis presents an empirical phenomenological study that tries to answer the research question: how is the enaction of knowledge experienced? An inspiration for the question lies in an observation that, in the field of personal epistemologies, the first-person aspect has not been sufficiently researched. The study takes as its starting point Perry's scheme of development of thoughts and values and epistemologically installs itself into the framework of enactivism – a paradigm that includes the first-person aspect as essential. Within the framework of enactivism the term knowledge is defined as well. In the study, the research method of second-person in-depth phenomenological inquiry was applied, which is explained and established in detail. Based on the findings a model of the dynamic structure of the enaction of knowledge was designed. The results confirm the presence of intersubjective and intrasubjective differences in the experience of the enaction of knowledge and open up new ideas and questions for future research.
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