Where is consciousness?

Kordeš, Urban (avtor)

I join Gasparyan’s discussion on a possibility of having a theory of consciousness without ignoring the intrinsic selfreferentiality of such an endeavour. My questions are: If we acknowledge the primacy of consciousness, is a theory of consciousness even possible? If so, what purpose would it serve? Explaining consciousness “from the inside” leads to some epistemological and methodological dilemmas, one of which is the encounter of phenomenal modalities that might not be accessible to explication. Gasparyan suggests that one such modality is the experience of differentiation. I try to clarify the terminology and suggest further research in this direction.

• Jezik: Angleški jezik
• Ključne besede: epistemology
• Vrsta gradiva: Delo ni kategorizirano
• Tipologija: 1.03 - Drugi znanstveni članki
• Organizacija: PEF - Pedagoška fakulteta
• Založnik: Brussels : Vrije Universiteit Brussel
• Leto izida: 2016
• Št. strani: 552-554
• Številčenje: 11
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-84269
• ISSN: 1782-348X
• COBISS.SI-ID: 11085385
• Datum objave v RUL: 18.08.2016

Gradivo je del revije

• Naslov: Constructivist Foundations
• Skrajšan naslov: Constr. Found.
• Založnik: Vrije Universiteit Brussel
• ISSN: 1782-348X
• COBISS.SI-ID: 515792665

Sekundarni jezik

• Jezik: Slovenski jezik
• Ključne besede: teorije