Does consciousness cause behavior? Implications for moral responsibility

Strle, Toma (avtor)

Various researchers have tried to show that conscious thoughts (or more generally, conscious states and processes) have no causal influence on our behavior (“no-conscious-influence” thesis), threatening our conception of ourselves as free willed, morally responsible beings. In this paper I will argue such claims are unwarranted. I will claim that understanding the human mind in a purely mechanistic and reductionist manner is impossible — conscious introspection (and first person knowledge) are necessary to grasp fully the meaning of data gained solely by third-person methods. If understanding human mind is impossible without conscious introspection and first person knowledge and if this understanding has causal influence on behavior, we have found an indirect influence of conscious states and processes on our behavior, falsifying the “noconscious- influence” thesis.

• Jezik: Angleški jezik
• Ključne besede: behaviour
• Tipologija: 1.08 - Objavljeni znanstveni prispevek na konferenci
• Organizacija: PEF - Pedagoška fakulteta
• Založnik: Inštitut Jožef Štefan
• Leto izida: 2014
• Št. strani: Str. 84-89
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-69179
• COBISS.SI-ID: 10244681
• Datum objave v RUL: 10.07.2015