In the introduction of the article two modalities of the construction
and functioning of an artwork—representation and performativity—
are presented in relation to the otherwise problematic classification of
art. Performativity is not so much the object of the analysis as it is the
negative of the field of study. The article continues with a discussion of
the notion of representation, which proceeds primarily from the point
of view of language and communication, since the thesis advanced
in the text is that visual representation is nothing other than visual
language—language is one of the basic forms of representation and
at the same time its field of entry. The question is therefore whether
language can teach us anything about visual representation. Is there
something like a “language of art” and is it a part of the intentional flow
of communication? The answer put forward in the text as it develops is
primarily that any artistic representation, albeit linguistic in nature—in
the sense that it has the structure of language—is by no means intended
to serve as communication; on the contrary, artistic language emerges
precisely in those places where communication fails. Representation is
not visual communication. In arguing his position, the author references
various concepts: Jakobson’s poetic function of language, Lacan’s
lalangue and the problem of the matheme, Kleist’s gradual construction
of thoughts during speech, Freud’s unconscious mind and other linguistic
figures. If representation is truly linguistic in nature, it follows that it
is not only composed of strict (linguistic, or in our case visual) rules,
but also includes the very limits and deviations from these rules. Any
systematisation of representation thus sooner or later shows its own
limitations. Language is a product of numerous boundaries that are
themselves constitutive in relation to it. In the context of the language
of representation, functionality is often mentioned as the capability
for communication, but the notion of disfunctionality carries the same
weight. In the dysfunctional, language expresses its own self-will or
whimsicality, but is no less meaningful, active or creative for it. It is
important to be aware of the dialectical reversal of meaning—the very
thing that seems at first sight to be the weakness of language, its lack of
capability, imprecision and constant breakdowns, is really what liberates
it and gives it a tremendous power: of falsehood and speculation, sense
and nonsense, poetics and even to very register of reality. The concluding
thought is that language does not describe, but expresses the world—
and the same is true of representation. Representation is not secondary, it does not duplicate the world and it does not merely portray, but co-create it. If visual representation is nothing other than language, then it cannot simply be a duplicate of something, or a way of naming things, an image of the world, but a kind of division—bringing into the world a kind of restlesness.
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