The purpose of this paper is to identify to what extent the strategic thought of Carl von Clausewitz is still relevant to understanding the dynamics of contemporary conventional armed conflicts. We will attempt to back individual theoretical bases of Clausewitzian theory with the use of historical examples from the 20th century. Clausewitz’s theory of war is far too extensive for one to thoroughly cover it in a paper of such dimensions, thus we will only be focused on certain aspects of it. To a lesser degree, we will also discuss the effectiveness of rear operations. Partisan operations, air interdiction operations, land forces maneuvering in enemy rear areas are all examples that fall under this category. Although these methods are thought to be very attractive in theory, they frequently fall short in practice. Glorified by proponents of maneuvre warfare and the strategy of indirect approach, Clausewitz warns that forces sent to operate against the enemy’s rear and flank are not avaliable for use against his front and those that penetrate deep into the enemy’s rear expose their own line of retreat.
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