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Farmers' preferences for result-based schemes for grassland conservation in Slovenia
ID Šumrada, Tanja (Author), ID Japelj, Anže (Author), ID Verbič, Miroslav (Author), ID Erjavec, Emil (Author)

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Abstract
Government-funded payments for ecosystem services (PES) have increasingly been used to facilitate transactions between users of environmental services and their providers. In order to improve the link between payments and the service provided, some countries in the EU have promoted result-based schemes (RBS), which remunerate farmers for ecological results, as part of their agricultural policy. Since PES programs are voluntary, it is important to understand farmers’ responses before more large-scale implementations of RBS are initiated. Using a choice experiment and a mixed logit model, we elicited the preferences of farmers in two Natura 2000 sites in Slovenia for different design elements of a hypothetical scheme for dry grassland conservation. We found that the majority of farmers preferred the result-based approach over the management-based scheme both in terms of payment conditions and monitoring; one group of farmers preferred the RBS very strongly (average WTA of more than 500 EUR/ha/yr) and another group less strongly (average WTA about 200 EUR/ha/yr). Farmers also showed a higher preference for on-farm advise and training in small groups than for lectures, which would be offered to a larger audience. A collective bonus, which would incentivise coordination and could potentially increase participation rates in the scheme, significantly influenced the farmers’ willingness to adopt the scheme. However, the estimated average WTA was comparable or lower than the 40 EUR/ha annual bonus payment. Older farmers and those who managed small and semi-subsistent farms were significantly more likely to be highly resistant to scheme adoption no matter its design.

Language:English
Keywords:payments for ecosystem services, agri-environmental measure, results-based scheme, collective bonus, biodiversity conservation, choice experiment
Work type:Article
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:BF - Biotechnical Faculty
EF - School of Economics and Business
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year:2022
Number of pages:12 str.
Numbering:Vol. 66, art. 126143
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-134864 This link opens in a new window
UDC:630*9
ISSN on article:1617-1381
DOI:10.1016/j.jnc.2022.126143 This link opens in a new window
COBISS.SI-ID:96358403 This link opens in a new window
Publication date in RUL:07.02.2022
Views:1389
Downloads:211
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Journal for nature conservation
Shortened title:J. nat. conserv.
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:1617-1381
COBISS.SI-ID:336635 This link opens in a new window

Licences

License:CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:agrarna politika, kmetijstvo, subvencije, ekosistemske storitve, plačilo za ekosistemske storitve

Projects

Funder:Other - Other funder or multiple funders
Funding programme:Republic of Slovenia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:P4-0022
Name:Ekonomika agroživilstva in naravnih virov

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:V4-1814
Name:Analitične podpore za večjo učinkovitost in ciljnost kmetijske politike do okolja in narave v Sloveniji

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