Institut škodljivih navodil v dejanskem koncernu

Šturm, Iva (author), Podobnik, Klemen (mentor)

Dejanski koncern temelji na kapitalski udeležbi, ki med družbami ustvarja odvisno razmerje. Obvladujoča družba ima zaradi večinskega lastniškega deleža v od nje odvisnih družbah povsem legitimen interes, da se zavzema za usklajeno koncernsko politiko in enotno vodenje, ki lahko prinese številne pozitivne učinke in izboljša položaj koncernskih družb na trgu. Če je koncern uspešno voden, so poslovni rezultati boljši in družbe so, ko se dobiček ne steka zgolj v vrh koncerna ali pa pride do izčrpavanj, finančno stabilnejše. Del dejanskega koncerna pa so tudi škodljivi vplivi, ko obvladujoča družba izkoristi svoj močnejši položaj in odvisno družbo pripravi do sprejetja ukrepa v njeno škodo. Takšna škodljiva navodila v skladu z institutom koncernskega privilegija niso protipravna, če je prikrajšanje pravočasno izravnano. Za dejanski koncern je značilna večja samostojnost odvisnih družb in s tem tudi njenih organov vodenja in nadzora. Ko so podvrženi škodljivim navodilom z vrha koncerna, se jim lahko podredijo, škodljiv pravni posel dokumentirajo in nato zahtevajo ustrezno nadomestitev prikrajšanja. Če pa ocenijo, da preti nevarnost, da prikrajšanje ne bo nadomeščeno, so tak pravni posel dolžni zavrniti. Magistrsko delo podrobno preučuje institut škodljivih navodil, varstvo zunanjih družbenikov odvisne družbe in položaj njenih poslovodnih organov, ko so ti soočeni z vzpodbudami, ki prihajajo s strani obvladujoče družbe. V dejanskem koncernu so dopustni zgolj vplivi, ki so izjemni in jih je v obliki prikrajšanja mogoče ovrednotiti. Vprašljiva pa je samostojnost uprave, ko so vplivi stalni, poleg tega pa v družbah vodilne funkcije zasedajo osebe z dvojnimi mandati.

• Language: Slovenian
• Keywords: institut škodljivih navodil – koncernski privilegij – dejanski koncern – večstopenjski koncern – pasivni koncernski učinki – odškodninska odgovornost organov vodenja in nadzora – ZGD-1 – Aktiengesetz
• Work type: Master's thesis/paper
• Organization: PF - Faculty of Law
• Year: 2020
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-128697
• COBISS.SI-ID: 56559619
• Publication date in RUL: 23.07.2021

Secondary language

• Language: English
• Title: The Institute of Detrimental Instructions in the Factual Concern

Abstract

A factual concern is based on equity participation, which constitutes a dependency between the companies. The parent company has, due to the majority ownership share in its subsidiaries, a legitimate interest in conducting a coordinated group policy and uniform management, which has many positive impacts and helps improve the market position of the group companies. If the group is managed efficiently, the business results are better and the companies are financially stable, as long as the profit is not distributed mainly to the head of the group and it does not threaten the financial position of the subsidiaries. When a parent company takes advantage of its stronger position and initiates the subsidiary to adopt a measure, which results in a loss for the subsidiary, we are referring to the detrimental instructions in factual concern. The mentioned detrimental instructions, in accordance with the group privilege, are not illegal if the loss is timely compensated. In the factual concern, the subsidiaries and their management and supervisory bodies are more independent. When subjected to detrimental instructions given by the parent company, they can follow the instructions and conclude a contract to its detriment, and subsequently demand appropriate compensation for it. However, if they asses that there is a possibility that the loss will not be compensated, they are obliged to reject the conclusion of such contract or measure. This Master's thesis analyses the institute of detrimental instructions, the protection of minority shareholders of the subsidiary and the position of subsidiary’s management bodies when they are subjected to detrimental instructions from the parent company. In the factual concern, only individual instructions that can be evaluated in the form of disadvantage are permitted. Nevertheless, the independent position of subsidiary’s management is questionable, particularly when the instructions are constant and a part of a standard practice at the parent company, and the leading management positions in the group companies are held by members with double mandates.

• Keywords: institute of detrimental instructions – privilege in a concern – factual concern – multilevel corporate groups – passive concern effects – damage liability of the management and supervisory bodies – Companies Act – German Stock Corporation Act