Restrictions on individual liberty and autonomy arise from the core nature of law, since coercion is one of the elementary characteristics of any functioning legal system. However, some legislative interventions into individual autonomy are not only problematic but also illegitimate. This thesis discusses two types of liberty-limiting principles that appear to be incompatible with liberal democracy: legal paternalism and legal moralism. The first part of the thesis defines and analyzes these two concepts, with particular focus on their manifestation in criminal law and the question whether legal paternalism and moralism are legitimate grounds for criminalisation. This is followed by the presentation of the fundamental legal-philosophical assertions of those authors who have been notably engaged with this issue. Finally, two specific paternalistic interventions of a Slovenian legislator – the limiting of individual life disposability as a legal good, and the compulsory insurance system – are taken into consideration. Their legitimacy is explored through the lens of three different theories of political philosophy.
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