Odškodninska odgovornost sodnikov in arbitrov

Cevc, Agata (author), Galič, Aleš (mentor)

Odškodninska odgovornost za pravilno delovanje sodstva je občutljivo vprašanje. Pravne ureditve morajo najti ustrezno ravnovesje med pravico do povračila škode in neodvisnostjo sodstva. Neodvisnost in nepristranskost postopka odločanja bi bila ogrožena, če bi sodnik neposredno odškodninsko odgovarjal in bil izpostavljen neutemeljenim tožbam strank, nezadovoljnih z izidom postopka. Zato mu je treba zagotoviti svobodno odločanje brez strahu pred tožbami razočaranih strank. Dodaten argument proti odgovornosti za sodne napake je varstvo načela pravnomočnosti. Strankam se ne sme omogočiti, da bi z odškodninskimi zahtevki posredno napadle vsebino odločitve, saj bi to privedlo do začaranega kroga sporov. Vendar lahko pretirano strogo razumevanje načela pravnomočnosti pride na račun pravičnosti. Z namenom ugotoviti, kako vzpostaviti ustrezno ravnotežje med omenjenimi vrednotami, disertacija primerjalnopravno analizira ureditev odškodninske odgovornosti sodnikov v anglosaksonskih in civilnopravnih državah. Anglosaksonske države sodnikom priznavajo absolutno imuniteto zaradi varstva njihove neodvisnosti. Posameznik ni upravičen do odškodnine, četudi je sodnik ravnal naklepno, dokler je ravnal v okviru svojih pooblastil in v mejah njegove pristojnosti. Odgovarjal bi le, če ravnanje ni sodno ali če ravna v odsotnosti pristojnosti (slaboverno oziroma v očitni odsotnosti vsakršne pristojnosti). Odgovornosti države za sodne napake namreč ne poznajo. Širšo varstvo oškodovancu zagotavljajo države s kontinentalnim pravnim redom, kjer velja načelo odškodninske odgovornosti države za delo njenih organov, tudi sodišč. Te države omogočajo povrnitev škode tudi kadar je posledica nepravilnega delovanja sodstva. Skoraj vse države neodvisnost sodstva zagotavljajo z izključno neposredno odgovornostjo države, ki ima možnost regresa zoper sodnika le v primeru naklepnega ravnanja (ponekod tudi v primeru hude, očitne malomarnosti). Ta rešitev je najustreznejša oziroma edina sprejemljiva glede na stališča, sprejeta v mednarodnih in evropskih dokumentih, ki so predstavljena v disertaciji. Vsi namreč soglasno zavračajo osebno odgovornost sodnika ter poudarjajo, da naj odgovarja le izjemoma, v primeru naklepa (in morda v primeru resne, ponavljajoče se malomarnosti). Ta pristop omogoča povrnitev škode od ekonomsko močnejšega subjekta ter hkrati varuje sodnike pred neutemeljenimi tožbami strank. V večini držav bo določena ovira za uveljavitev odškodninskega zahtevka pravnomočnost sodne odločbe: odgovornost za škodo, ki izvira iz pravnomočne sodne odločbe bodisi izključujejo bodisi pogojujejo s predhodno razveljavitvijo (ugotovitvijo nezakonitosti) pravnomočne odločitve oziroma z obstojem kaznivega dejanja sodnika. Prav tako mora za uspeh z odškodninsko tožbo oškodovanec praviloma izčrpati vsa razpoložljiva pravna sredstva. Zaradi sodne prakse Sodišča Evropske unije (v nadaljevanju Sodišča) v zadevah Köbler, Traghetti in Ferreira da Silva se je v večini držav izoblikoval dvojen režim odgovornosti – jurisprudenca omogoča odškodninske zahtevke (kljub pravnomočnosti), kadar sodišče zadnje stopnje očitno prekrši pravo Evropske unije (v nadaljevanju EU). Disertacija predstavi tudi ureditev odškodninske odgovornosti sodnikov v Sloveniji. Ugotovi, da v Sloveniji neposredno odgovarja le država - velja objektivizirana krivdna odgovornost. Država bi tako odgovarjala tudi za kumulativne in anonimne napake. Zavzame stališče, da bi sodnik za napake v zvezi s sojenjem regresno odgovarjal le, če bi bil pravnomočno obsojen v disciplinskem ali kazenskem postopku. Za druge napake in opustitve pa v primeru naklepnega ali hudo malomarnega ravnanja. Takšna ureditev ustreza tako zahtevam, ki jih je izoblikovala sodna praksa Sodišča, kakor tudi mednarodnim in evropskim standardom. Ker je arbitraža neke vrste zasebno sodišče – zagotavlja način reševanja sporov, ki se konča z izdajo zavezujoče arbitražne odločbe, je obravnavana tudi odškodninska odgovornost arbitrov. Tudi arbiter namreč nastopa kot »zasebni sodnik« - tj. kot neodvisna, tretja oseba, katere odločitev stranki zavezuje in ima učinek pravnomočne sodbe. Zato za arbitre prav tako pridejo v poštev omenjeni razlogi za varstvo pred odškodninskimi zahtevki. Namen tega dela disertacije je ugotoviti, kdaj arbiter odgovarja za nepravilno izpolnjevanje svojih obveznosti in kdaj se lahko sklicuje na imuniteto zaradi podobnosti njegove funkcije s sodniško. Ni enotnega pristopa glede odškodninske odgovornosti arbitrov. Vprašanje je povezano z dvojno naravo arbitraže, ki ima sodni predmet in namen kljub pogodbenemu izvoru. Pooblastilo za odločanje v sporu arbitru namreč podelijo stranke s pogodbo, s katero se zaveže opraviti storitev v zameno za plačilo. Zato doktorska disertacija zavzame stališče, da je treba ločeno obravnavati njegovo odgovornost, kadar nastopa kot pogodbena stranka. Anglosaksonske države arbitrom izrecno priznavajo imuniteto, saj enačijo njihovo vlogo s sodnikovo. Civilnopravne države pa poudarjajo pogodbeno razmerje med arbitrom in strankami, kar bi privedlo do odgovornosti v skladu s splošnimi pravili pogodbenega prava. Kljub različnim izhodiščem, skoraj vsi razviti pravni sistemi arbitru priznavajo določeno varstvo v okviru njegove sodniške funkcije zaradi zaščite neodvisnosti postopka odločanja ter dokončnosti arbitražnih odločb. Tako arbiter ne odgovarja za postopkovne ali vsebinske nepravilnosti odločitve, saj imajo stranke v tem primeru možnost pravnega sredstva zoper arbitražno odločbo. Kljub temu skoraj vsi pravni sistemi določajo izjemo od imunitete, kadar arbiter naklepno krši temeljne sodniške dolžnosti. Razlike med pristopoma so večje glede odgovornosti za izpolnjevanje obveznosti, ki se ne nanašajo na reševanje sporov (tj. za kršitev pogodbenih dolžnosti). Anglosaksonske države imuniteto, ki jo uživa zaradi sodniške funkcije, razširijo tudi na njegovo pogodbeno vlogo, čeprav so v zadnjih letih priznale odgovornost za neupravičen odstop. Nasprotno bi v civilnopravnih državah arbiter lahko odgovarjal tudi za (navadno) malomarnost v skladu s splošnimi pravili pogodbenega prava. Na koncu so na kratko izpostavljene še pogodbene izključitve in omejitve odgovornosti, ki so pogosto vsebovane v arbitražnih pravilih institucij. Ugotovljeno je, da so absolutne izključitve odgovornosti v večini pravnih sistemov, vključno s slovenskim, neveljavne. Disertacija določi, katero je merodajno pravo v primeru odškodninske tožbe zoper člane mednarodne arbitraže. Ob odsotnosti zakonodaje in sodne prakse disertacija predlaga rešitev - kvalificirano imuniteto, ki bi arbitrom nudila varstvo v okviru njihove sodne vloge, tako da bi odgovarjali le v primeru prevare ali namerne kršitve sodniških dolžnosti. Za kršitev pogodbenih dolžnosti pa bi odgovarjali v skladu splošnimi pravili pogodbenega prava.

• Language: Slovenian
• Keywords: odškodninska odgovornost, imuniteta, sodniki, pravo EU, odškodninska odgovornsot države za sodniške napake, arbitraža, arbitražno pravo, arbitri, odškodninska odgovornsot arbitrov
• Work type: Doctoral dissertation
• Organization: PF - Faculty of Law
• Year: 2020
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-116202
• COBISS.SI-ID: 17353475
• Publication date in RUL: 22.05.2020

Secondary language

• Language: English
• Title: Civil liability of judges and arbitrators

Abstract

The aim of the thesis is to present, assess and critically evaluate civil liability of judges and arbitrators. Civil liability for judicial errors is a sensitive topic. It is important to find a balance between the right to compensation and the independence of the judiciary. Judges must be able to decide impartially, without fear of suit from parties dissatisfied with the judgement. It is feared that liability would influence the independence and impartiality of the judiciary if judges were sued directly by parties dissatisfied with the outcome of the dispute. Judges must be able to decide without fear of being harassed by unsatisfied parties. Another argument against civil liability is that it would lead to endless proceedings, endangering the principle of “res judicata“ or the legal force of the judgement. However, an overly rigorous understanding of the principle of res judicata could come at the expense of individual justice. To find a proper balance between the conflicting values, the thesis provides a comparative analysis of the regulation of civil liability of judges in common law and civil law countries. Common law countries provide absolute immunity to judges to protect their independence. The injured party cannot claim compensation even when the judge acted in bad faith if the judge acted within his powers or competences. Judges can be liable only for non-judicial acts or acts performed in the absence of jurisdiction (in cases of bad faith or in the clear absence of all jurisdiction). State liability for judicial wrongs does not exist. Wider protection is accorded in civil law countries due to the principle of state liability for damages caused by its public authorities, including courts. They provide compensation when damages result from the improper functioning of the judiciary. However, almost all civil law countries guarantee the independence of the judiciary by providing that only the state can be sued directly with a right of recourse when the judge acted intentionally (and in some countries in cases of gross, clear negligence). This is the only acceptable solution according to international and European documents that are presented in the thesis. They unanimously reject the possibility of personal liability of judges and emphasize that they should be liable only in exceptional cases when they acted intentionally (or, arguably, with repeated, serious or gross negligence). This approach provides compensation from an economically stronger debtor while at the same time protecting judges against unfounded lawsuits. In most countries the finality of judgements provides an obstacle to a liability claim: it either excludes the possibility of such claim or requires the prior reversal, (declaration of unlawfulness) of a final decision or criminal responsibility of a judge as a precondition for state liability. Due to the case law of the Court of Justice (Köbler, Traghetti and Ferreira da Silva cases), a double liability regime exists in most countries - jurisprudence allows claims for damages (despite the res judicata effect of the judgement) when the court adjudicating at last instance manifestly infringes the applicable EU law. The liability regime in Slovenia is presented. Only the state can be held liable directly – it is also responsible for cumulative and anonymous errors because there is an objective approach to the fault-based liability. A judge could be liable through recourse (for errors related to deciding the dispute) if he was convicted in a disciplinary and criminal procedure. In other cases, he could be liable (through recourse) in case of deliberate or gross negligence. The liability regime in Slovenia is in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice as well as international and European standards. Since arbitrators resolve disputes by rendering arbitration awards that are legally binding and enforceable, their civil liability is also presented. Arbitrators act as private judges - they resolve disputes which require a binding decision of an impartial third party. Therefore, the reasons for immunity apply to arbitrators as well. The aim is to determine situations when arbitrators are personally liable for damages caused and when they enjoy immunity because of their judicial role. There is no uniform approach regarding civil liability of arbitrators. The question is closely connected with the dual nature of arbitration that has a judicial mission despite a contractual origin. Arbitrator’s power derives from a private contract and they receive payment from the parties in exchange for professional services. Due to the double role of arbitrators civil liability for breaches of arbitrator’s contractual obligations and breaches of duties regarding their judicial role is discussed separately. Common law countries provide immunity to arbitrators based on equating their function to that of judges. On the other hand, civil law countries emphasize the contractual relationship between the arbitrators and parties and determine liability according to ordinary law of contract. Despite different starting points most jurisdictions accord a certain degree of immunity to arbitrators in the exercise of their judicial role to ensure the finality of arbitral awards and protect the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. Arbitrators are therefore not liable for the procedural or material accuracy of their decisions because in such cases the parties can bring an action against an award. However, almost all legal systems exclude immunity in cases where the arbitrator intentionally violated his judicial duties. The differences between civil and common law countries are greater regarding liability for breaches of the arbitrator’s contractual duties. In civil law countries arbitrators could be liable for negligence according to general rules of contract law. Contractual limitations and exclusions of liability are also mentioned. The thesis concludes that absolute exclusions of liability are unenforceable in most jurisdictions. The thesis determines which law should apply to the issue of civil liability of international arbitral tribunals. In the absence of legislation and jurisprudence in Slovenia the thesis suggests that qualified immunity should apply. Arbitrators should enjoy immunity for judicial acts, except in exceptional cases of fraud and deliberate violations of their judicial duties. For breaches of their contractual duties, arbitrators should be liable according to general rules of contract law. The courts could apply the stricter standard of unlawfulness that applies for judicial errors to arbitral liability based on reasons of public policy (to ensure the independence of arbitrators.

• Keywords: civil liability, immunity, judges, EU law, civil liability of the state for judicial errors, arbitration, arbitration law, arbitrators, civil liability of arbitrators