Smiselnost protiukrepov v sistemu reševanja sporov v Svetovni trgovinski organizaciji

Ferengja, Ajda (author), Podobnik, Klemen (mentor)

Kljub temu da statistični podatki kažejo, da naj bi države v 90 odstotkih ravnale v skladu z odločitvami, sprejetimi v sistemu reševanja sporov Svetovne trgovinske organizacije (WTO), nam odmevnejši primeri trgovinskih sporov med svetovnimi velesilami, v katerih so bili uvedeni protiukrepi, pred očmi rišejo nekoliko drugačno sliko. Primeri, kot sta dlje časa trajajoča spora med Evropsko unijo (EU) in Združenimi državami Amerike (ZDA) glede uvoza banan in hormonsko obdelane govedine v EU, ki kljub uvedenim protiukrepom še nekaj časa po uvedbi le-teh nista (bila) razrešena, vzbujajo dvome o smiselnosti protiukrepov. Med državami članicami in teoretiki se odvijajo polemike okrog primernosti tega mehanizma, njegovih številnih pomanjkljivostih in morebitnih predlogih za izboljšanje. Kot eno večjih pomanjkljivosti se izpostavlja dejstvo, da so protiukrepi v nasprotju s cilji liberalizacije trgovine in državi, ki jih uvede, povzročajo stroške. Poleg tega ne omogočajo povračila za škodo, ki jo je država utrpela zaradi sprejetja ukrepov, neskladnih s pravili WTO, kar lahko državi kršiteljici predstavlja spodbudo za zavlačevanje postopka in vzdrževanje spornega ukrepa. Vse to pa prizadane predvsem države v razvoju. Predlogi za izboljšanje obstoječega sistema, kot sta na primer pogostejša in enostavnejša uporaba protiukrepov v drugih sektorjih oz. sporazumih in kolektivni protiukrepi, bi sicer nekoliko izboljšali položaj držav v razvoju, vendar ne bi rešili težav, povezanih s stroški. Težave s stroški bi morda lahko rešili z uvedbo obvezne kompenzacije, ki bi odpravila problematiko dodatnih ovir, ki jih predstavljajo protiukrepi, ali pa z uvedbo denarne odškodnine, ki bi oškodovani državi povrnila nastalo škodo ter spodbudila toženo državo k čimprejšnji odstranitvi spornih ukrepov.

• Language: Slovenian
• Keywords: protiukrepi, prekinitev koncesij ali drugih obveznosti, trgovinski spori, ZDA, EU, sistem reševanja sporov v WTO, WTO
• Work type: Master's thesis/paper
• Organization: PF - Faculty of Law
• Year: 2018
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-103104
• COBISS.SI-ID: 16358481
• Publication date in RUL: 14.09.2018

Secondary language

• Language: English
• Title: Meaningfulness of countermeasures in the World Trade Organization dispute settlement system

Abstract

Eventhough statistical data shows that compliance rate with dispute settlement rulings in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is at around 90 percent, high-profile trade disputes between world powers demonstrate a different picture. Cases like long lasting trade disputes between European Union (EU) and United states (US) regarding importation of bananas and hormone treated beef into EU, which were not resolved for quite some time even after countermeasures were imposed, raise doubts about meaningfulness of countermeasures. Controversy exists among member states and academics as to whether this mechanism is appropriate, regard its many flaws and possible reform proposals. As one of the biggest disadvantages exposed, is the fact that countermeasures are in contrary to the goals of trade liberalization and that they impose economic costs on the country that introduced them. They also do not provide reimbursement for the damage a country had suffered because of the measures inconsistent with WTO rules, which may give a defending state an incentive to delay proceedings and to maintain the inconsistent measure. All the given facts have an impact on developing countries in particular. Proposals to reform the system, such as more frequent and easier use of cross-retaliation and collective countermeasures might improve the position of developing countries, but they would not solve economic cost issues. Issues related to economic costs might be resolved by introducing mandatory compensation into the dispute settlement system that would address the issue of additional trade barriers or by introducing financial compensation that would compensate affected state and at the same time give the responding country the incentive to remove the WTO-inconsistent measures as soon as possible.

• Keywords: countermeasures, suspension of concessions or other obligations, trade disputes, US, EU, WTO dispute settlement system, WTO