20.500.12556/RUL-178275 Cognizing an Object’s Universal Features for Its Identity A Contemporary Debate between Nyāya and Buddhism Spoznavanje univerzalnih značilnosti predmeta za njegovo identiteto sodobna razprava med nyāyo in budizmom In everyday life, people cognize many objects. A question thus arises, how do we cognize an object? Do we cognize and identify an object through its observable (secondary) or universal (primary) features? According to the Nyāya School, we cognize an object through its “universal features”, as they manifest in each constituent of the object. Due to these universal features, we identify an object with a name. Further, Naiyāyikas said that when we cognize an object, our cognition will not be regarded as determinate cognition if we do not identify it with a name. The reason is a determinate cognition necessarily requires cognition of an object’s universal features and identification of an object with a name. Further, it possesses the conceptual construction of the object. In contrast to the Nyāya School, Buddhism argues that a determinate cognition need not require cognition of an object’s universal features and conceptual construction of the object. This is because people cognize objects through their observable features, not through universal features, and the latter are not identified and referred to through sense organs. Against this backdrop, the paper discusses nature, features, and two facets of cognition; “recognition” and “conceptualization”. It critically examines Buddhist arguments and methods for cognizing objects of the world. The paper concludes that the arguments of the Nyāya School on cognizing an object’s universal features for its identity are not convincing, and hence not justifiable. In contrast, Buddhism’s view of cognizing objects through their observable features is reasonable and justifiable.  V vsakdanjem življenju ljudje spoznavajo številne predmete, zato se postavlja vprašan-je, kako spoznavajo predmete. Ali predmet spoznavamo in prepoznavamo na podlagi njegovih opazljivih (sekundarnih) ali univerzalnih (primarnih) značilnosti? Po mnenju pripadnic in pripadnikov šole nyāya predmet spoznavamo prek njegovih »univerzalnih značilnosti«, kot se kažejo v vsaki sestavini predmeta. Zaradi teh univerzalnih značilnosti predmet identificiramo z imenom. Nadalje, Naiyāyikas je dejal, da ko spoznavamo pred-met, naše spoznanje ne bo veljalo za determinirano spoznanje, če ga ne bomo poistovetili z imenom. Razlog je v tem, da determinirano spoznavanje nujno zahteva spoznavanje univerzalnih lastnosti predmeta in identifikacijo predmeta z imenom. Poleg tega ima po-jmovno konstrukcijo predmeta. V nasprotju s šolo nyāya budizem trdi, da determinira-no spoznanje ne zahteva nujno spoznanja univerzalnih lastnosti predmeta in pojmovne zgradbe predmeta. To pa zato, ker ljudje spoznavajo predmete prek njihovih opazljivih lastnosti, in ne prek univerzalnih lastnosti, slednjih pa ne prepoznavajo in se nanje ne sklicujejo prek čutnih organov. V tem kontekstu članek obravnava naravo, lastnosti in dva vidika spoznavanja: »prepoznavanje« in »konceptualizacijo«. Kritično premišljuje budistične argumente in metode za spoznavanje predmetov sveta. Prispevek ugotavl-ja, da argumenti šole Nyāya o spoznavanju univerzalnih lastnosti predmeta za njegovo identiteto niso prepričljivi in zato niso upravičeni. Nasprotno pa je budistično stališče o spoznavanju predmetov na podlagi njihovih opazljivih lastnosti razumno in upravičeno. Buddhism cognition non-conceptual perception conceptually constructed perception universal features observable features Nyāya School budizem spoznavanje nekonceptualno zaznavanje konceptualno zas-novano zaznavanje univerzalne značilnosti opazne značilnosti šola nyāya true false false Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Članek v reviji 2026-01-22 12:14:33 2026-01-22 12:14:35 2026-01-27 11:14:23 0000-00-00 00:00:00 0 0 0 Str. 179-194 no. 2 Vol. 13 2025 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 2025-05-09 2232-5131 2350-4226 https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2025.13.2.179-194 RAZ_Kumar_Nishant_0.pdf RAZ_Kumar_Nishant_0.pdf 1 C51B320D434C3767392DCE79C011A367 6ab2708eade11f8101ff20d1e55a7d4b6f1a956fa1b99e6d7be3db885b3611fc c8a967b0-f783-11f0-a1ba-0050569b8976 https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=225967 https://journals.uni-lj.si/as/article/view/21315 0 ef5cc67f-fb68-11f0-a1ba-0050569b8976 https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=226234 Filozofska fakulteta 0 0 0