20.500.12556/RUL-171685 Stabilna prirejanja na dvostranskih trgih delo diplomskega seminarja Stable Matchings on Two-Sided Markets Dvostranski trgi modelirajo interakcije med dvema skupinama udeležencev s preferencami akterjev na drugi strani. Klasični primeri vključujejo dodeljevanje študentov šolam ali zdravnikov bolnišnicam. Osrednji predmet proučevanja v nalogi so mehanizmi, ki zagotavljajo stabilna prirejanja. To so taka prirejanja, kjer ni para udeležencev, ki bi raje bila drug z drugim kot s trenutnim partnerjem. Analiza se osredotoča na matematične lastnosti stabilnih prirejanj, kot so njihov obstoj, optimalnost za eno stran in dovzetnost za strateško manipulacijo. Čeprav so nekateri mehanizmi odporni na manipulacijo za predlagajočo stran, lahko druga stran izboljša svoj izid z lažnim poročanjem preferenc. V nalogi formalno obravnavamo manipulacije preferenčnih seznamov in identificiramo pogoje, v katerih strateško obnašanje vodi do ugodnejših izidov. Two-sided markets model interactions between two groups of participants who have preferences over the other side. Classic examples include the assignment of students to schools or doctors to hospitals. The central focus of this thesis is on mechanisms that produce stable matchings. These are matchings in which there is no pair of participants who would prefer to be with each other rather than with their current partner. The analysis concentrates on the mathematical properties of stable matchings, such as their existence, side-optimality, and susceptibility to manipulation. While some mechanisms are manipulation-proof for the proposing side, the other side may still improve their outcome by misreporting preferences. In this thesis, we formally study manipulation of preference lists and identify the conditions under which strategic behavior leads to more favorable outcomes. stabilno prirejanje Gale-Shapleyjev algoritem enostranska manipulacija stable matching Gale-Shapley algorithm one-sided manipulation true false false Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Delo diplomskega seminarja/zaključno seminarsko delo/naloga 2025-08-30 08:15:13 2025-08-30 08:15:16 2025-09-14 04:07:00 0000-00-00 00:00:00 2025 0 0 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 519.8 151988 247170307 18874.pdf 18874.pdf 1 9BAFA91A8C3DC3342B36BE5B5DB65917 4c2d55db512cecfe10723dbbf86539ef2159be45abe22c98569377e347ae1191 8f1d0b38-8568-11f0-9328-0050569b8976 https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=215067 Fakulteta za matematiko in fiziko 0 0 0