Embodied, enacted and experienced decision-makingStrle, Toma (Avtor) decision-makingcognitionexperiencephenomenologyneurophenomenologyIn this paper I will attempt to show that mainstream contemporary approaches to understanding and researching decision-making – endorsing the goals and core presuppositions of traditional cognitive science – provide a limited account of decision-making at best. Firstly, they falsely presuppose that decision-makers are mostly making some sort of calculation regarding objective states of a pregiven world, independent from decision-makers. Secondly, even though the majority of approaches admit subjectivity into the picture of decision-making, they mostly try to avoid it or objectify it. Thirdly, the interactive history of decision-makers with their environment and the role of the body are in large part left out of research designs and explanations of decision-making. Even though there has been a surge of proposals of embodying decision-making in recent years, they do not take the theses of embodied cognition far (or seriously) enough (at least from the perspective of the enactivist view of embodied cognition) – they, for instance, do not take the lived (experienced) body, experience of decision-makers, or sense-making as central to decision-making. Borrowing and extending the ideas from (neuro)phenomenology and enactivism, I will argue that decision-making is best understood from the perspective of what sense and meaning situations, decisions, and the process of decision-making have from and in the (experiential) perspective of decision-makers. As a consequence, I will further claim that decision-making science must begin researching the experience of decision-makers rigorously and systematically if it is to understand the phenomenon in a less limited and a more meaningful way.20162016-12-28 02:30:17Članek v reviji88360UDK: 165ISSN pri članku: 1318-3362COBISS_ID: 513568386slPodatek o licenci CC BY 4.0 je naveden na pristajalni strani članka (glej zgoraj izvorni URL). (Datum opombe: 20. 8. 2025)