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<metadata xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><dc:title>What does it mean to be the case in Wittgen­stein’s Tractatus?</dc:title><dc:creator>Jõeleht,	Karel	(Avtor)
	</dc:creator><dc:subject>Zhang Shenfu</dc:subject><dc:subject>Mou Zongsan</dc:subject><dc:subject>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</dc:subject><dc:subject>comparative philosophy</dc:subject><dc:subject>interpretation</dc:subject><dc:description>Zhang Shenfu and Mou Zongsan were both major intellectual figures of the 20th century. Zhang is chiefly remembered for introducing Bertrand Russell’s philosophical thought and logic into Chinese academic and intellectual circles, while Mou is best known for his con­tributions to Modern Confucianism. Notably, both scholars also translated Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus into Chinese, Zhang’s version being the first, and Mou’s the third Chinese rendition of the work. The opening proposition of the Tractatus states: “The world is all that is the case”. Here, what “is the case”, namely the facts, are the exist­ing states of affairs. However, Zhang and Mou each offered distinct interpretations of this proposition, especially when it comes to the notion of what “is the case”. By examining Zhang’s and Mou’s translation work in a comparative manner, this paper shows how their divergent renderings of what “is the case” and its cognate concepts do not simply reflect different linguistic choices, but rather deeply affect the development and shape two dis­tinct philosophical interpretations of the Tractatus’ opening ontological claim.</dc:description><dc:date>2026</dc:date><dc:date>2026-10-30 12:55:14</dc:date><dc:type>Članek v reviji</dc:type><dc:identifier>190610</dc:identifier><dc:identifier>ISSN pri članku: 2232-5131</dc:identifier><dc:identifier>DOI: 10.4312/as.2026.14.3.177-200</dc:identifier><dc:language>sl</dc:language></metadata>
