Political polarization and compromise in secession politicsRamsay, Kristopher W. (Avtor) Prezelj, Iztok (Avtor) bargainingpolarizationcontestWhy do some secession movements lead to violent conflict, others are resolved through policy concessions, while still others end in peaceful separation? Existing theories focused on information asymmetries or commitment prob- lems cannot fully explain this variation in outcomes. We propose a bargaining theory of secession incorporat- ing three critical factors: policy polarization, credible exit, and resource rents. We demonstrate that secessions dif- fer from standard bargaining problems because successful separation creates two independent policy-setting enti- ties. Our analysis reveals that, even with complete information, policy differ ences alone can trigger conflict when polarization exceeds critical thresholds. Equally important, we identify conditions where peaceful partition becomes rational. The usefulness of this framework is demonstrated through comparative analysis of cases, including Su- dan, Czechoslovakia, and Panama. By explaining compromise, peaceful separation, and violent secession within a unified model, this research advances our theoretical understanding of when political unions endure or dissolve.20262026-07-02 10:45:27Članek v reviji184238UDK: 32:329.273ISSN pri članku: 0020-8833DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqag025COBISS_ID: 283380483sl