Fragments of consciencePejda, Katarzyna (Avtor) early ConfucianismFour Booksconsciencemoral emotionsinnate moral knowledge (liang zhi)self-cultivationThis paper reconsiders the concept of conscience in the Confucian tradition through an analysis of the Four Books—Lunyu (The Analects), Mengzi (Mencius), Daxue (Great Learning), and Zhongyong 中庸 (On the Practice of the Mean)—within a comparative and interdisciplinary framework. Conscience is reconstructed as a functional constella­tion, with the heart-mind xin (心) and innate moral knowing liang zhi (良知) at its core, activated by moral emotions (especially “shame” (chi 恥), “aversion” (xiu 羞), and “com­passion” (ceyin zhi xin 惻隱之心)) and stabilized through ritual learning, role-reflection, and self-examination. Unlike dominant Western accounts that often portray conscience as an internal, stable, and individual “moral voice”, early Confucian discourse presents moral discernment as a dynamic process cultivated through affective responsiveness, ritu­al practice, and reflection on one’s social roles. Particular attention is given to Mencian moral psychology, where emotions are not merely subjective reactions but action-guid­ing ethical intuitions rooted in the “sprouts” (duan 端) of virtue and oriented toward ren (仁) and yi (義). The analysis argues that Confucian conscience is best understood as a moral habitus: an internalized yet evolving disposition shaped through daily self-culti­vation (xiushen 修身) and relational participation in social life. At the same time, this account preserves the Mencian claim that moral responsiveness was originally endowed: liang zhi is treated as an innate moral orientation whose clarity and efficacy depend on cultivation, ritual habituation, and reflective extension. By bringing early Confucian texts into dialogue with contemporary moral psychology and ethical theory, the paper offers a culturally grounded alternative to reductive universalist models, while acknowledging Confucian aspirations toward moral universality.20262026-10-30 12:46:22Članek v reviji190606sl