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<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><rdf:Description rdf:about="https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/IzpisGradiva.php?id=185002"><dc:title>Off-centre AI</dc:title><dc:creator>Fazi,	M. Beatrice	(Avtor)
	</dc:creator><dc:subject>artificial inteligence</dc:subject><dc:subject>ethics</dc:subject><dc:subject>alignment</dc:subject><dc:subject>anthropocentrism</dc:subject><dc:subject>decentring</dc:subject><dc:subject>human-centred artificial inteligence</dc:subject><dc:subject>theoretical antihumanism</dc:subject><dc:description>This article examines the legacies of antihumanism within the context of artificial in-telligence (AI) research. In response to the ethical risks inherent to the proliferation of quasi-autonomous computational agents, the AI industry, legislative bodies and academia often advocate for a “human-centred” approach that would align AI with human values, desires and goals, ostensibly to make these technologies more transpar-ent and trustworthy. The rhetoric of human-centred AI reveals many of the conceptual limitations that antihumanism had already identified in the foundationalist and sub-jectivist assumptions of Western philosophy. This article considers some of these chal-lenging limitations while also problematizing antihumanism itself. Through Derrida’s notion of “centre” and an analysis of alignment methodologies, the article demon-strates how attempts to decentre the human often reconstitute new forms of authority. It then examines the possibility of surpassing standard anthropocentric approaches in AI while maintaining a critical philosophical engagement with the structurally neces-sary yet precarious character of organizing principles.</dc:description><dc:date>2026</dc:date><dc:date>2026-07-20 12:48:32</dc:date><dc:type>Neznano</dc:type><dc:identifier>185002</dc:identifier><dc:language>sl</dc:language></rdf:Description></rdf:RDF>
