Reconsidering Wendt's meta-theoryBrglez, Milan (Avtor) international relationstheory of international relationsscientific realismsocial constructivismmethodological positivismstatismAlexander WendtThe main argument of the article is that claims of scientific realism and social constructivism cannot be compatible in the ways Wendt tries to defend them in his Social Theory of International Politics. Neither scientific realism nor social constructivism makes much sense in conjunction with positivist methodology, which is ontologically predominantly anti-realist and epistemologically objectivist. The combination Wendt proposes is thus either a particular positivist variation of scientific realism or a particular positivist variation of social constructivism, and strips scientific realism and social constructivism of their more radical consequences for understanding and explaining international relations. The claims that the discipline of International Relations (IR) practically need not fear Wendt, and that IR theorists are better off engaging (not ignoring) him may be substantiated if his scientific realism is detached from methodological positivism. His metatheory, in addition to more sophisticated variants of scientific realism (e.g. critical realism), offers more possibilities than his reductionist strategy of theorising allows to be seen into the really comp lex ontology of international relations. Thus, the fact that he dares to speak about the reality "out there" should not be discarded too easily, and some proposals are developed throughout the text on how to accommodate such a claim always conjectural - with scientific realism and social constructivism.20012022-03-30 13:43:08Članek v reviji135785sl