

**UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
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Diplomsko delo

**VPLIV MEDIJEV NA PORAST ISLAMOFODIJE V
PRIMERJALNI PERSPEKTIVI MED AVSTRIJO IN
SLOVENIJO**

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Diploma thesis

**THE IMPACT OF THE MEDIA ON THE RISE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND SLOVENIA**

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ABSTRACT

Although many people do not take Islamophobia as a serious issue, Islamophobia is becoming one of the leading threats against peace and unity in Europe. Islamophobia is not just something that happened over the night, it is a series of hate crime, discrimination, and vilification that accumulated in past years against Muslims in Europe.

The diploma thesis presents the impact of the media in Austria and Slovenia with the aim of focusing on acceptances of Islam in both countries as so outline the extent to which Islamophobia reaches. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is an examination of media interference in the religious world of Austria and Slovenia.

The paper also presents an explanation of Islam as a religion, for an easier understanding of the concept of Islamophobia, as so the teaching of the Holy Quran in order to clarify misconceptions about Islam.

The thesis addresses the emergence of Islamophobia in both countries and the role and impact of the media on it. We use a descriptive, historical, and comparative method. In the research part, we focus on examing the Parliamentary election 2018 in Slovenia and the Parliamentary election 2017 in Austria in order to present the leading causes of the victory of a particular political party and their connection with Islamophobia. Throughout the research, we found that the media have a huge impact, generally on society, but when it comes to certain topics, such as Islamophobia, data shows that in both countries there are media with a high rate of discrimination and hatred towards Muslims. The media were used in a way to produce fear and rejection of Muslims by society in both countries. In order to show the general influence of the media, especially on the rate of Islamophobia, we presented the role of the media during the elections and came to the results that the media are actually one of the key factors in succeeding of political parties and in increasing Islamophobia in countries. Thus, the Austrian media were the main source of information and coverage of political campaigns, which advocated the fight against so-called political Islam, and thus presented their campaign as an ideal protector of citizens in the fight against Islam. Unfortunately, data on media consumption display the huge public interest which indicates that the media have not only succeeded in attracting viewers but have also succeeded in their ultimate goal, influencing society to vote for parties that support anti-Islamic acts. In the case of Slovenia, we have the same scenario, where right-wing political party owns certain media and use them especially in time of elections to promote their right-wing policy of anti-migrations and anti-Islamic aims. Even though we do not have data

about media consumption in this case, still media have succeeded to influence society to vote for the party that advocates anti-migration policy.

Keywords: Islamophobia, Europe, Austria, Islam, Slovenia, media, religion, the Holy Quran, The Parliamentary election, Anti-migration policy.

POVZETEK

VPLIV MEDIJEV NA PORAST ISLAMOFBIJE V PRIMERJALNI PERSPEKTIVNI MED AVSTRIJO IN SLOVENIJO

Čeprav islamofobije veliko ljudi ne jemlje kot resno vprašanje, postaja ena od vodilnih groženj miru in enotnosti v Evropi. Islamofobija ni samo nekaj, kar se je zgodilo čez noč, temveč je niz zločinov, storjenih iz sovraštva in diskriminacije, ki so se nabirala v preteklih letih proti muslimanom v Evropi.

V diplomski nalogi je predstavljen vpliv medijev v Avstriji in Sloveniji z namenom, da se osredotočijo na sprejemanje islama v obeh državah, saj tako orisujejo obseg doseganja islamofobije. V ospredju te teze je torej preučevanje medijskega vmešavanja v verski svet Avstrije in Slovenije.

Predstavljena je tudi razlaga islama kot religije za lažje razumevanje pojma islamofobije, s čimer bi razjasnili napačne predstave o islamu. Teza obravnava pojav islamofobije v obeh državah ter vlogo in vpliv medijev nanjo. V nalogi uporabljamo opisno, zgodovinsko in primerjalno metodo.

V raziskovalnem delu se osredotočamo na preučitev parlamentarnih volitev leta 2018 v Sloveniji in parlamentarnih volitev leta 2017 v Avstriji, saj želimo predstaviti glavne vzroke za zmago določene politične stranke in njihovo povezavo z islamofobijo. Skozi raziskavo smo ugotovili, da imajo mediji velik vpliv na družbo. Vendar ko gre za določene teme, kot je islamofobija, podatki kažejo, da v obeh državah obstajajo mediji z visoko stopnjo diskriminacije in sovraštva do muslimanov. Mediji so bili uporabljeni na način, da so ustvarili strah in zavrnitev muslimanov s strani družbe v obeh državah. Da bi pokazali vpliv medijev, zlasti na stopnjo islamofobije, smo predstavili vlogo medijev med volitvami. Pri tem smo prišli do rezultata, da so mediji eden ključnih dejavnikov za uspeh političnih strank in povečanje islamofobije v državah. Tako so bili avstrijski mediji glavni vir informacij in poročanja o političnih kampanjah, ki so zagovarjale boj proti tako imenovanemu političnemu islamu, hkrati pa so s svojo kampanjo sebe predstavile kot idealnega zaščitnika državljanov v boju proti islamu. Podatki o porabi medijev kažejo, da je medijem uspelo doseči svoj končni cilj – vplivali so na družbo, ki bo glasovala za stranke, ki podpirajo protiislamska dejanja. V primeru Slovenije imamo enak scenarij, kjer ima desničarska politična stranka v lasti določene medije in jih zlasti v času volitev uporablja za spodbujanje njihove politike proti migracijam in islamskim ciljem. Čeprav v tem primeru nimamo podatkov o porabi medijev, je medijem vseeno uspelo vplivati na družbo in podpreti stranko, ki zagovarja protimigracijsko politiko.

Ključne besede: islamofobija, Evropa, Avstrija, Islam, Slovenija, mediji, religija, Sveti Koran, Parlamentarne volitve, Anti-migracijska politika.

V diplomskem delu obravnavamo pojav islamofobije v Avstriji in Sloveniji ter glavne vplive, ki so povzročili ta pojav. Islam je kot religija že dlje časa prisotna v Avstriji in večjih konfliktov z oblastmi v zvezi z njo ni bilo. Prvi vidnejši konflikt se je pojavil v času parlamentarnih volitev leta 2017, ko so se nekatere politične stranke odločile, da bo eden od ciljev strank boj proti tako imenovanemu »političnemu islamu«. Ta boj je dal posameznim političnim strankam pravico, da se prek medijev vmešavajo v pomen islama. Zato bomo v tem primeru raziskovali vpliv medijev na rezultate parlamentarnih volitev leta 2017.

Če Slovenijo primerjamo z Avstrijo, je islam kot religija v Sloveniji šele na začetku vključevanja v državo. Leta 1960 so muslimani prvič zaprosili za dovoljenje za gradnjo mošeje, vendar so ga dobili šele 2015. Z gradnjo mošeje v Ljubljani je tako nastalo prvo islamsko središče in hkrati druga mošeja. Prvo mošejo v Sloveniji so leta 1914 zgradili bošnjaški vojaki, ki so se borili na strani Avstro-Ogrske. Poleg gradnje druge džamije je ogromno pozornosti v politiki, zlasti desnih strank, in v medijih, predvsem slovenskega desničarskega medija Nova24TV, pritegnilo ime ulice, to je »Ulica mošeje«, kjer stoji džamija. Kot vemo, se desničarska stranka v Evropi navadno zavzema za strogo begunsko politiko in njihovo zavračanje na evropskih tleh. Tudi Slovenska demokratska stranka (SDS) je med parlamentarnimi volitvami leta 2018 predstavljala prihod migrantov kot nevarnost za slovenske državljane, s čimer je zbirala politično podporo. Vendar je povezava med migracijami in islamom v desnih medijih veliko bolj vzpostavljena na islamofobni način.

Razlog zakaj želimo predstaviti problematiko omenjene teme, je v tem, da smo kot študenti Fakultete za upravo, ki se ukvarjamo z upravljanjem javnega sektorja, pridobili sposobnost kritičnega in analitičnega razmišljanja. Zaradi tega se zavedamo nujnih multidisciplinarnih sprememb, ko gre za islamofobijo kot eno od perečih težav v družbi. Kot bodoči mladi voditelji prevzemamo odgovornosti pri sprejemanju pomembnih odločitev o družbenih, političnih in pravnih vidikih, ki predstavljajo nepogrešljiv delež v politiki in javni upravi. Prav slednje predstavljata regulacijo volilnega sistema in medijskega prostora.

Namen diplomske naloge je raziskati vlogo medijev in njihov način prikazovanja islama v Avstriji in Sloveniji, predvsem zaradi koristi držav kot tudi miru in enotnosti v obeh.

Mediji v sodelovanju z desnimi političnimi strankami poskušajo prikazati strah pred muslimani in hkrati svojo stranko predstavljajo kot zaščitnika pred valom muslimanov, ki prihajajo v državo. Poleg tega desničarske stranke s svojim programom ustvarjajo predsodke do islama in muslimanov. Zato je v pričujoči diplomski nalogi naš cilj prikazati dokaze teh trditev.

Med raziskovanjem se bomo osredotočili na naslednje cilje:

- na konceptualno-teoretični ravni izpostavili različne koncepte islamofobije, kjer bomo predstavili različna mnenja avtorjev o islamofobiji;
- predstavili zgodovinsko ozadje islama in izrazili svoje osebno mnenje o islamu kot religiji;
- pokazali, kako se je muslimanska vera sprva vključila v kulturo Avstrije in Slovenije ter tako pridobila svoje pravice z zakonom;
- predstavili pojem medijev in njihov vpliv na družbo;
- raziskali vpliv medijev na porast islamofobije;
- predstavili rezultate parlamentarnih volitev v Avstriji in Sloveniji;
- predstavili vpliv medijev na rezultate v obeh državah.

V nadaljevanju diplomske naloge bomo uporabili različne raziskovalne pristope:

- z opisno metodo opisali glavne pojme, ki jih najdemo v delu in so povezani s temo;
- na teoretični ravni predstavili islamofobijo, kjer bomo opisali različne pristope več avtorjev;
- s pomočjo zgodovinske metode ugotovili, kako so mediji vplivali na islamofobijo in kako jo razumemo skozi zgodovino;
- z uporabo metode sinteze v teoretičnem delu dobili odgovore na vprašanja, zakaj je islamofobija v porastu ter kako so na njen porast vplivale avstrijske in slovenske politične stranke;
- z analizo sekundarnih podatkov predstavili rezultate parlamentarnih volitev v Avstriji in Sloveniji;
- s primerjalno metodo primerjali podobnosti in razlike med Avstrijo in Slovenijo.

V nalogi smo si zastavili dve hipotezi:

- Vpliv medijev na porast islamofobije v Avstriji in Sloveniji je bil med volitvami zelo izrazit.
- Muslimani so sami odgovorni za nastanek islamofobije v Avstriji in Sloveniji zaradi pretiranega priseljevanja v državi.

V zadnjem delu diplomske naloge bomo predstavili različne dokaze, s katerimi bomo potrdili ali ovrgli hipotezi.

V drugem poglavju diplomske naloge bomo s pomočjo zgodovinske metode predstavili pomembna dejstva o islamu, njegovem zgodovinskem ozadju in glavnem viru, to je Svetem Koranu, kot tudi vključevanje islama v avstrijsko in slovensko družbo. V tretjem bomo z opisno metodo opisali definicijo teoretskih konceptov ter predstavili vzrok in pojav islamofobije v obeh državah. V četrtem bomo s pomočjo teoretične metode opredelili koncept medijev, njegovo vlogo in vpliv na družbo tako v Avstriji kot tudi v Sloveniji. Peto

in šesto poglavje imata isti koncept; v obeh bomo s pomočjo sekundarne analize podatkov predstavili rezultate parlamentarnih volitev v prej omenjenih državah in vpliv medijev na te rezultate. V sedmem poglavju bomo predstavili podobnosti in razlike med Avstrijo in Slovenijo. V zadnjem pa bomo na kratko obrazložili cilj diplomske naloge in predstavili rezultate, s katerimi bomo potrdili ali ovrgli hipotezi.

V zaključnem delu diplomske naloge se z analizo avstrijskih parlamentarnih volitev leta 2017 dotaknemo praktičnega primera vpliva medijev. Naš cilj je pokazati, koliko politikov se je pojavilo v medijih, koliko potencialnih volivcev si je ogledalo volitve, kako so v medijih uporabljali medijske in islamofobne vsebine za zmago na volitvah ter širili strah in trepet med avstrijskim prebivalstvom, da bi predstavili svojo stranko kot idealno zaščito avstrijskega ljudstva pred islamom in islamizacijo.

Vprašanja priseljevanja, nadzora meje in antiislama so bila glavna ideologija vseh treh strani. Prvič, zmagovalna stranka ÖVP (ang. The Austrian People's Party) z 31-odstotnim deležem glasov, ki jo vodi Sebastian Kurz, lahko svojo zmago pripiše njegovi protimigracijski in antimuslimanski kampanji, ki se je popolnoma zlila z medijsko vsebino, polno sovražnih stereotipov. Drugič, SPÖ (ang. The Social Democratic Party of Austria) je bil eden glavnih podpornikov stranke FPÖ (ang. The Freedom Party of Austria), ker je podpiral zakon o prepovedi muslimanskih tančic s pokrivanjem obrazov in zaostrovanjem imigracijskega statusa. Podatki kažejo, da je Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP) na teh volitvah zelo dobro odigral svojo vlogo. Med volitvami leta 2015 je namreč trdil, da je islam del Avstrije in da so priseljenci pomemben del avstrijske družbe, ki pomagajo gospodarstvu. Vendar je stranka ÖVP leta 2015 na volitvah dosegla le majhen odstotek glasov (zgolj 24 %). Tako je imel Kurz med volitvami 2017 novo ideologijo, ki je presenetljivo skoraj identična ideologiji stranke FPÖ (zmagovalna stranka leta 2015), ki se bori proti »političnemu islamu«.

Glavno vprašanje je, kakšno vlogo so pri vseh teh rezultatih imeli mediji. Ker poznamo cilje te kampanje, bomo pokazali, katera orodja so uporabljali in kako pogosto so se pojavljali v medijih. Prvič, volilno kampanjo 2017 so zaznamovale različne spremembe. Čeprav je televizijsko oglaševanje volilnih kampanj v Avstriji zakonsko prepovedano, pa je SPÖ napovedala, da bodo veliko denarja vložili v televizijske oglase (statistika kaže, da je šlo 18 % sredstev iz sklada kampanje). Poleg tega ta kampanja vlaga v medije in spletna orodja, namesto da bi se predstavljala na plakatih. Družbene medije uporabljajo kot uveljavljeno sredstvo za kampanjo. Vsak od kandidatov je imel svoj profil na Facebooku, stranke pa so uporabljale tudi YouTube kanal z izdajo več kot 500 videov v šestih kampanjskih tednih. Javna radiotelevizija Österreichischer Rundfunk (v nadaljevanju besedila: ORF) še naprej prevladuje na televizijskem trgu in je imela pomembno vlogo pri promociji ciljev teh strank. ORF, ki upravlja štiri televizijske kanale, je v letu 2015 dosegel desetkrat več gledalcev kot

najbolj priljubljen zasebni kanal Puls 4, ki je v lasti medijskega podjetja ProSiebenSat.1. ORF je podvržen političnemu vplivu, ker stranke prek skrbniškega odbora izdajatelja televizijskih programov sodelujejo pri izbiri njegovega predsednika (Press Freedom Index, 2018).

TV-razprave med pari najboljših kandidatov so dobro uveljavljeni dogodki v avstrijskih kampanjah ter vzbujajo veliko pozornosti med volivci in novinarji (Plasser, Fritz, & Günther, 2010, pp. 193-240). Leta 2017 je deset dvojnih razprav, ki jih je organizirala javna radiotelevizija, v povprečju pritegnilo več kot 700.000 gledalcev (11 % volivcev). Več kot 1,2 milijona gledalcev (19 % volivcev) si je ogledalo zadnji krog z vsemi najboljšimi kandidati (OFR, 2017). To je bilo najbolj obsežno poročanje doslej, ki ga je ORF ponudil pred volitvami v nacionalni svet – z več kot 72 urami intervjujev v živo, analizami, televizijskimi razpravami, poročili in prispevki ter približno 500 poročil v skupni dolžini nekaj manj kot enajst ur za izbiro programov ZiB v ORF 1 in ORF 2. Zato so imeli vsi državljani možnost, da so o teh razpravah obveščeni tako v javnosti (ORF) kot tudi prek dveh glavnih zasebnih kanalov (Puls 4 in ATV).

Samo »krog najboljših kandidatov« je dosegel do 1.409 milijonov ljudi, ki jih zanima politika (v povprečju 1.211 milijonov z 41-odstotnim tržnim deležem, 39 odstotkov v ciljni skupini od 12 do 49 let in 36 odstotkov od 12 do 29 let v živo na ORF 2). To je bil najuspešnejši krog po letu 2006 in daleč najbolj gledani program v času volitev na avstrijski televiziji (OFR, 2017). Kar 29 od 30 najširših TV-formatov za volitve v državni svet 2017 je bilo prikazanih na ORF. Od 100 televizijskih minut, ki jih je javnost gledala na avstrijskih TV-kanalih v času parlamentarnih volitev, jih je bilo 74 mogoče pripisati TV-programom ORF. Več kot dva milijona Avstrijcev je volilne dvoboje videlo izključno na ORF (in nihče od komercialnih konkurentov). S svojimi volilnimi spopadi je imel ORF tudi največ gledalcev v vseh ciljnih skupinah. Javno zanimanje za predtekmovanje volitev 2017 je bilo ogromno: rekordno število je doseglo »poletne pogovore« s Tarekom Leitnerjem, ki so bila tudi prva pogajanja v tistem volilnem letu na ORF. V povprečju si je pet razprav ogledalo 782.000 gledalcev z 28-odstotnim tržnim deležem; v ciljni skupini mladih, starih od 12 do 49 let, je bil tržni delež 21-odstoten (OFR, 2017), kar pomeni, da so bili »poletni pogovori« 2017 najbolj gledani v zgodovini serije. »Poletni pogovor« s Sebastianom Kurzom je bil najbolj gledan »poletni pogovor« doslej. Volitve 2017 so bile na ORF-ju tudi hit na družbenih medijih: Facebook stran ORF je imela več kot 6 milijonov ogledov videov in več kot 1,2 milijona interakcij.

Kaj nam vse to pove? Vsi cilji, ki so jih te stranke imele naperjene proti muslimanom, imigraciji, zaščiti meja, prepovedi nošenja burke za muslimanke, zapiranju muslimanskih vrtcev, vodenju islamskih centrov, so bili predstavljeni na javni televiziji. Slišani so bili po vsej Avstriji, zato se je večina Avstrijcev strinjala z njimi. Po volilnem vodniku je volilna udeležba znašala 79 odstotkov, kar pomeni, da je na teh volitvah volilo 5.120.881 Avstrijcev

(Election Guide, 2017). Kar 1.595.526 Avstrijcev je glasovalo za Avstrijsko ljudsko stranko (ÖVP), 1.361.746 za Avstrijsko socialdemokratsko stranko (SPÖ), 1.316.442 pa za Stranko svobode Avstrije (FPÖ). Čeprav njihove ideologije takrat niso bile podprte z močnimi dokazi, so stranke med volitvami uporabile medije kot stalni opomin, da bi lahko bilo življenje Avstrijcev boljše, če bi bili sprejeti predlogi teh strank, če bi glasovali za boljši jutri, če bi se zanašali na te stranke, ki bi nas v prihodnosti rešile pred tako imenovanim političnim islamom, muslimani in njihovimi prepričanji. In očitno jim je uspelo. Mediji, zavedno ali nezavedno, močno vplivajo na nas. So eden najlažjih načinov manipulacije z ljudmi, pa naj si to priznamo ali ne.

Z uporabo podobnega pristopa kot pri analizi parlamentarnih volitev v Avstriji leta 2017 bomo na primeru volitev prikazali, kako so mediji vplivali na rezultate parlamentarnih volitev v Sloveniji leta 2018. Najprej bomo predstavili, kako in v kolikšni meri so se na televiziji in radiu pojavljale politične stranke med volitvami 2018 ter kako je to vplivalo na odnos do migrantov, torej muslimanov, ki prihajajo v državo.

V volilni kampanji so nekateri predstavniki zmagovalne stranke SDS uporabili neliberalno retoriko o vprašanih migracij in civilne družbe. SDS je razobesila tudi ogromne plakate, ki so opozarjali na migrantsko invazijo in obljubljali, da ne bodo niti enemu migrantu dovolili vstopa v državo. Vendar je Janez Janša (SDS) odigral vlogo odprtega in dostopnega politika, ki je vsem ponujal roko sodelovanja. Na javnih nastopih je pokazal veliko spretnosti in izkušenj, česar novinci in številni tekmovalci njegove druge lige preprosto niso imeli. Po strokovnih standardih je bila kampanja SDS precej pred drugimi (Lovec, 2018, p. 5)

Vemo, da so politične stranke odvisne od medijev in da predstavljajo najhitrejšo vez med politiko in družbo. Kot smo že omenili, je televizija odigrala ključno vlogo na avstrijskih volitvah leta 2017, saj je televizija oblika medija, ki je razumljiv vsem, nepismenim, starejšim ljudem in tudi otrokom. Zakon o medijih v tem primeru določa pravila, katerih namen je pravična zastopanost političnih stališč v novicah in informativnih oddajah na kanalih in storitvah PSM (ang. Public service media), vendar ni imenovanega organa, ki bi imel učinkovito izvršilno pooblastilo, ki bi to predstavništvo spregledalo (Milosavljevic, Gerjevic, & Petkovic, 2018).

V konkretnem primeru predstavljamo, kako pogosto so se politične stranke med volitvami 2018 pojavljale na televiziji.

Znano je, da SDS upravlja televizijsko postajo Nova24TV in njihovo vsebino, poleg tega pa ima tudi uredniško podporo političnih časopisov Reporter in Demokracija, katerih vsebino poznamo kot tudi njihov odnos do islama in migracij. Pred parlamentarnimi volitvami 12. marca 2018 je agencija Parsifal, ki izvaja tržne in javnomnenjske raziskave, opravila anketo

za Novo24TV, ki kaže, da bi velika večina volivcev, več kot 70 odstotkov, glasovala za SDS, stranko, ki, domnevno, ima program s konkretnimi rešitvami. Gre za logično zaključeno napihnjeno analizo, saj je v tej analizi več kot 70 odstotkov državljanov glasovalo za stranko SDS, vendar resnični parlamentarni rezultati 3. junija 2018 kažejo, da je za to stranko glasovalo le 24,92 odstotka državljanov. To je bil poskus psihološke narave, ki je družbi vnaprej pokazal rezultate, kako bi glasovala večina. Podoben model so uporabili v Mehiki med skorumpirano vlado. Pri tem je pomembno poudariti, da je prav Nova24TV vztrajala pri takšni analizi in jo tudi objavila.

V tem primeru televizija in radio igrata glavno vlogo in sta hkrati glavni vir informacij med volitvami. Redne volitve so bile poleg televizijskega poročanja predvajane na Radiu Slovenija, predvsem na Prvem programu PRVI. Radio Slovenija je predvajal pet soočenj strank, ki so trajala uro in pol in so se v sredo ob 17. uri predvajala v živo. Obravnavane so bile različne teme, od zunanje politike, migracij do reševanja problemov v slovenskem zdravstvu. Razprave strank je bilo možno spremljati tudi v živo prek Facebooka. Prav tako je Prvi program PRVI vsak dan ob 11.15 napovedal predstavitev kandidatov in strank, ki bodo kandidirale v vseh volilnih enotah.

Sveži rezultati javnomnenjskih raziskav so bili objavljeni vsak petek, ob 16.30 pa je bila na Prvem programu PRVI objavljena tudi analiza aktivnosti kandidatov iz prejšnjega tedna. Trditve kandidatov na soočenjih in predstavitev so preverili tudi novinarji programa PRVI ter dejstva primerjali s podatki.

Kar zadeva televizijo, RTV Slovenija je prikazovala soočanja kandidatov na volitvah leta 2018 med predsedniki vseh strank, parlamentarnih in neparlamentarnih. Prva, ustanovna razprava je bila v ponedeljek, 7. maja 2018, ob 20. uri, ko se je kampanja tudi uradno začela na RTV Slovenija. Do 1. junija so potekala soočanja med predsedniki strank in parlamentarnimi strankami, razgovori s predstavniki zunajparlamentarnih strank, razprave med neparlamentarnimi strankami kot tudi razgovori s predstavniki parlamentarnih strank.

Poleg televizijskih razprav med strankami so predstavljali tudi politične dejavnosti, televizijske reklame o strankah in samozastopanje političnih strank. Zakaj jemljemo televizijske razprave kot primer vpliva na islamofobijo, zlasti v času volitev 2018? Med televizijskimi razpravami, kjer kandidati razpravljajo med seboj, se morajo v trenutkih hitre razprave zavedati, da so odgovorni za svoje odgovore, ki jih je treba premišljeno podati. Eden takšnih primerov je vprašanje zunanje politike. Čeprav problem migracij v Sloveniji ni tako razširjen kot v Avstriji, so se predstavniki strank borili proti množičnim migracijam in širjenju radikalne islamizacije. Zmagovalna stranka SDS je bila med volitvami prva stranka, ki je predlagala vzpostavitev nadzora na obmejnih območjih. Poslanci SDS so med

televizijskimi razpravami opozarjali, da migracijski tokovi predstavljajo največji varnostni izziv tako za Slovenijo kot Evropsko unijo. To je edini razlog, da bi morala Vlada Republike Slovenije pripraviti ukrepe in rešitve glede migracijskih tokov, parlament pa jih ima pravico in hkrati dolžnost seznaniti z njimi. Opozarjali so tudi na to, da je bila Slovenija na migrantsko krizo v drugi polovici leta 2015 in v prvih mesecih leta 2016 povsem nepripravljena. Po mnenju poslancev se takšno stanje ne sme ponoviti.

Je vse to vplivalo na to, da so Slovenci sploh šli glasovat? Kako se je to odražalo v njihovem odnosu do muslimanov? Čeprav ni podatkov o stopnji gledanosti volitev 2018, je po volilnem vodniku volilna udeležba na parlamentarnih volitvah v Sloveniji znašala 52 odstotkov, natančneje 901.457 glasov (Election Guide, 2018). Torej, če primerjamo to število s številom glasov samo za zmagovalno stranko SDS, ki je bilo 222.042 (Election Guide, 2018), lahko potrdimo dejstvo, da je SDS skupaj s svojo protimigracijsko kampanjo vplivala na Slovence. Večino Slovencev jim je uspelo prepričati, da glasujejo za protimigracijsko politiko, s tem pa so prispevali k povečanju stopnje islamofobije v državi.

Cilj diplomske naloge je bil približati ljudem resnično sliko islama. Želeli smo pokazati, da ne gre za religijo, ki zagovarja nasilje, prisilo in ubijanje nedolžnih ljudi. Samo nerazumevanje religije je privedlo do islamofobije v mnogih evropskih državah, tudi v Avstriji in Sloveniji. Naš cilj je bil med drugim tudi pokazati, ali so mediji vplivali na povečanje stopnje islamofobije v prej omenjenih državah. Glede na naše podatke lahko jasno rečemo, da imajo mediji velik vpliv na družbo, vendar ko gre za določene teme, kot je islamofobija, podatki kažejo, da v obeh državah obstajajo mediji z visoko stopnjo diskriminacije in sovraštva proti muslimanom. Mediji so bili uporabljeni na način, da so ustvarili strah in zavrnitev muslimanov s strani družbe v obeh državah. Da bi pokazali vpliv medijev, zlasti na stopnjo islamofobije, smo predstavili vlogo medijev med volitvami. Pri tem smo prišli do rezultata, da so mediji eden od ključnih dejavnikov za uspeh političnih strank in povečanje islamofobije v državah. Tako so bili avstrijski mediji glavni vir informacij in poročanja o političnih kampanjah, ki so zagovarjale boj proti tako imenovanemu »političnemu islamu«, hkrati pa so s svojo kampanjo sebe predstavile kot idealnega zaščitnika državljanov v boju proti islamu. Podatki o porabi medijev kažejo, da je medijem uspelo doseči svoj končni cilj; to je, da so vplivali na družbo, ki bo glasovala za stranke, ki podpirajo protiislamska dejanja. V primeru Slovenije imamo enak scenarij, kjer ima desničarska politična stranka v lasti določene medije in jih uporablja zlasti v času volitev za spodbujanje njihove politike proti migracijam. Čeprav v tem primeru nimamo podatkov o porabi medijev, je slednjim vseeno uspelo vplivati na družbo in podpreti stranko, ki zagovarja protimigracijsko politiko.

Na podlagi vseh raziskav o vplivu medijev na islamofobijo v Avstriji in Sloveniji lahko potrdimo prvo hipotezo.

Potrjujemo hipotezo, ki temelji na statističnih podatkih o porabi medijev med volitvami. Iz podatkov je razvidno, da je medijem med volitvami uspelo pritegniti javni interes, zlasti s prikazovanjem novic z islamofobno vsebino, da bi dosegli zmago svoje stranke. Boj proti islamu in migracijam je bil med volitvami glavna politika obeh držav, kar je dodatno povzročilo povečanje stopnje islamofobije.

Drugo hipotezo ovržemo, ker se pojavljanje islamofobije ni pojavilo pri prvih generacijah priseljenih muslimanov, ampak z nakopičenimi vrstami sovražnih zločinov, diskriminacije in mrženj do muslimanom v preteklih letih. Glavni razlog nesprejmanja islama je njegovo nerazumevanje, kar ne nazadnje povzroča pojav islamofobije.

Kot priporočilo za prihodnje delo bi navedli zavedanje o pomenu mladih visoko izobraženih ljudi. Kako pritegniti mlade, da se vključijo v politiko in javni sektor ter s tem »osvežijo« politični svet Evrope. Mladi imajo objektivna mnenja, njihova zastopanost pa presega meje države. Na Evropo gledajo kot celoto, kar vodi k lažjemu in bolj odprtemu delu pri spremljanju zakonodaje EU. Drugo priporočilo pa bi bila pravna ureditev predvolilnih objav. Menimo, da je oglaševanje s posredovanjem nezanesljivih informacij in/ali zavajajoče, neprepoznano ali prikrito oglaševanje lahko zelo nevarno, zlasti v času volitev. Ko rečemo, da je prej omenjeno oglaševanje lahko zelo nevarno, mislimo s tem na napačne informacije, ki krožijo v medijih med volilno kampanjo, zaradi katerih ljudje niso sposobni prepoznati, ali so resnične ali ne. Ne nazadnje to vodi v spremembo mnenja o posameznih političnih kampanjah in na koncu celo do zmage nekaterih političnih strank. Zakon o pravni ureditvi predvolilnih objav bi urejal preglednost in točnost takšnih objav.

Upamo, da nam je s to diplomsko nalogo uspelo razjasniti napačne predstavitve o islamu in zmanjšati stopnjo islamofobije v prihodnosti.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SPÖ	The Social Democratic Party of Austria
ÖVP	The Austrian People's Party
FPÖ	The Freedom Party of Austria
SDS	The Slovenian Democratic Party
LMS	The List of Marjan Sarec
SD	The Social Democrats
IGGiÖ	Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich/ The Islamic Religious Community in Austria
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ÖIF	The Austrian Integration Fund
ORF	Österreichischer Rundfunk
CE	Common Era
PSM	Public service media

1 INTRODUCTION

In the diploma thesis, we discuss the occurrence of Islamophobia in Austria and Slovenia and the main impacts that caused this phenomenon. Namely, Islam has been a part of Austria for a long time and there were no major conflicts with the authorities, until the 2017 parliamentary elections, when some political parties decided that one of the goals would be fighting against so-called "political Islam". The fight against "political Islam" has given the right to individual political parties to interfere in the pillars of Islam and thereby used media to present this way as the right way. We will investigate in this case the impact of media on results of the Parliamentary election 2017.

As far as Slovenia is concerned, Muslims in Slovenia is at the very beginning of integrating Islam in the country, in regard to Austria. Namely, in 1960 Muslims first applied for a permit to build a mosque, but it was not built until 2015 where they obtained a permit to build a mosque in Ljubljana. It is the first Islamic center but the second mosque, because in 1914 the first mosque was built in Slovenia and was built by Bosniak soldiers in World War I, who fought on the side of Austro-Hungary. In addition to the construction of the second mosque, huge attention in politics and the media, especially the right-wing parties and Nova24TV (Slovenian right-wing news media) has attracted the name of the street "Mosque Street", in which the mosque is currently built. As we know, the right-wing party in Europe is usually in favour of strict refugee policy and their rejection on European soil, and so is the right-wing one in Slovenia. The SDS (Slovenian Democratic Party), during the parliamentary elections of 2018, presented the emergence of migrants as a danger to Slovenian citizens and thus collected political support for right-wingers. However, the link between Migration and Islam is much more established in right-wing media in an Islamophobic way.

The reason why we want to discuss and present the issues of this topic is, that as students of the Faculty of Administration, majoring in public sector governance, we have acquired the ability to think critically and analytically, and as a result, we are aware of urgent multidisciplinary changes when it comes to Islamophobia, as one of the problems in society. Students of the Administration, as future young leaders, take on the responsibilities of making important decisions on the social, political, and legal aspects, and represent an indispensable share in politics and public administration, which represent stakeholders in the regulation of the media space and electoral system.

The purpose of the diploma thesis is to investigate the role of the media and its way of portraying Islam in these two countries, mainly because of the benefit of countries, as well as peace and unity in it.

In order to gather more votes for right-wing political parties, the media, in collaboration with right-wing political parties, are trying to portray the fear of Muslims, portraying their party as a protector against the wave of Muslims coming to the country in the future. Technically, by voting for right-wingers, people create prejudices about Islam and Muslims because they have fears that political parties convey through the media. And in the thesis, our aim is to display the evidence of these claims.

During the research, we pursue the following goals in particular:

- at the conceptual-theoretical level, we highlight different conceptions of Islamophobia, where we present different opinions of the author on the concept of Islamophobia,
- we present a historical background of Islam and we express our personal opinion on Islam as a religion,
- we show how the Muslim religion was initially integrated into the culture of Austria and Slovenia and thus obtained its rights by law,
- we present the notion of media and their impact on society,
- we research the impact of media on the rise of the Islamophobia,
- we present results of the Parliamentary election in Austria and Slovenia,
- Using the concept of media, we examine the impact of the media on results in both countries,

In the continuation of diploma work, we used different research approaches:

- using the descriptive method, we describe the main concepts found in the work and related to the subject,
- at the theoretical level, we introduce Islamophobia where we describe the different approaches of several authors,
- using the historical method, we determine how media influenced on Islamophobia and how it is understood throughout history,
- using the synthesis method, we get answers in the theoretical part to the question of why Islamophobia is on the rise and how its rise has been influenced by the Austrians and Slovenian political parties,
- with the analysis of secondary data, we present results of the Parliamentary election in Austria and Slovenia,
- using a comparative method, we compare differences and similarities between Austria and Slovenia

In the work we set out the following hypothesis:

- The impact of the media on the rise of Islamophobia in Austria and Slovenia was significantly expressed during the elections.
- Muslims themselves are responsible for the emergence of Islamophobia in Austria and Slovenia due to excessive immigration to states.

The hypotheses will be presented in the last part, where we will first present the various evidence that is necessary for the hypothesis to be confirmed or disconfirmed.

In the second chapter of the thesis, using the historical method, we will present significant facts about Islam, its historical background, and the main source, the Holy Quran. In the same chapter, we will present the integration of Islam into the Austrian and Slovenian society. Turning to the third chapter, using the method of description, we will describe the definition of theoretical concepts, and present the cause and occurrence of Islamophobia in both countries. In the fourth chapter, using the theoretical method, we will define the concept of media, its role and impact on society in general, and on our samples, the society of Austria and Slovenia. Chapters five and six have the same concept of work, where we will use secondary data analysis to present the results of the parliamentary elections in both countries, and how the media, together with politicians, have had an impact on these results. In the seventh chapter, we will show what are the similarities and differences between Austria and Slovenia, reflecting on the presented data. In the last chapter, we will briefly present what was the goal of the diploma and the result with which we will confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses.

2 ISLAM AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM

In order to better understanding of term Islamophobia, it is necessary to understand the religion of Islam, with aim of distinguishing affiliation of these two terms. In this chapter we are focusing to historical background and origins of Islam.

Islam is a monotheistic faith centered around belief in the one God (Allah). In this regard, it shares some beliefs with Judaism and Christianity by tracing its history back to the patriarch Abraham, and ultimately to the first prophet, Adam. All the prophets preached the same universal message of belief in one God and kindness to humanity (United religions initiative (URI), 2019).

Besides this, Islam presents a religion and civilization made its entry onto the world stage with the life and career of the Prophet Muhammed ibn Abd Allah s.a.v.s.¹ (further the Prophet Muhammed) ca. 570-632 in western Arabia. (Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammed is the last prophet and after him will not be any other prophet). After his death, a serious of successor called *caliphs*² claimed political authority over the Muslims community. During the period of caliphate, Islam grew into religious tradition and civilization of worldwide importance. A properly historical view of Islam's appearance and early development, however, demands that these processes be situated against the cultural background of sixty-century Arabia, and more generally, the Near East (Esposito, 1999, S. 1).

The Prophet Muhammed plays an essential role in spreading religion and verses from the Holy Quran. Before him, there were numerous other prophets who also called for Islam, but according to Islamic beliefs, Muhammad is the last prophet and there will be no more prophets after him.

The Prophet Muhammad was born in 570 CE (Common Era) in the city of Mecca in the Arabian Peninsula, part of modern-day Saudi Arabia. As his father had died shortly after marriage, his grandfather became his guardian. He used frequent a cave that became known as "Hira "" on the Mountain of "Nur" for contemplation. It was in that cave in 610 CE, i.e. at the age of forty, that Prophet Muhammad received from Allah the first verses of the Quran. Then and there, history changed (Fatoohi, 2009, S. 5-7).

¹ Salallahu alejhi we sellem or abbreviated form s.a.v.s. of Arabic origin means, "May Allah's mercy and peace be upon Him," and it is mandatory to use this abbreviation after mentioning every Prophet in Islam.

² Caliph- Arabic khalifah ("successor"), in Islamic history the ruler of the Muslim community. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2019)

In this cave the Archangel Gabriel appeared to him and reveal to them first verses of Quran. First verses of Quran were: *"Ikre Bismi Rabbike"* (Quran, 610, S. 96:2-6), which means to read in the name of your Lord (Allah). After the first verse, the Prophet had the duty to transmit and teach other people by inviting them to Islam.

The Quran continued to be revealed in fragments to the Prophet Muhammad over the following twenty-two years. The last words of the Holy Book were revealed to the Prophet shortly before his death in 632 CE (Fatoohi, 2009, S. 9-10). During their mission, prophet faces with many battles, harassments and abuse as so their followers. Prophet instructed Muslims to escape from tortures and executions caused by enemies of Islam. Biggest immigration was named Hijra.

The concept of Hijrah, which presents the Prophet Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE, have a huge impact in Islam. Because of persecutions among Muslims and difficult to practice their religion in Mecca, the Prophet migrated to Medina. Hence, in the mainstream Islamic discourse, Hijrah constitutes moving from Dar al-Harb to Dar al-Islam. "Dar al-Harb, which literally means—" house of war", refers to lands where Islamic law is not implemented or where Muslims do not enjoy the freedom to practice their religion. Conversely, Dar al-Islam, which literally means —" house of Islam", refers to areas under the rule of Islam" (Ebstein, 2006, pp. 53-85). The traditional meaning of Hijrah, therefore, is that only Muslims who are unable to practice Islam, or face opposition when they do so, are obligated to migrate to the lands of the Muslims (Ebstein, 2006, S. 53-85).

The Prophet lived in Medina for about ten years. By the time of his departure from this world in 632 CE, Islam had become well established as the religion of the Arabian Peninsula and had made inroads in neighbouring regions; Muslims had become a major force to be reckoned with in the area (Fatoohi, 2009, S. 20-23). After a ninth years, year before Prophet death, he went to *pilgrimage*³ to Mecca, and he received following verse of the Quran:

"This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed My favor upon you and have chosen for you Islam as religion" (Quran, 610, S. 5:4)

This verse said in effect that the message which the Prophet had brought from God and which by word and deed he had been expounding all these years, had been completed. Every part of this Message was a blessing. The Message now completed embodied the highest blessings which man could receive from God (Aḥmad, 2013, S. 182).

³ Pilgrimage (arab. Hajj)- one of the main Muslim duty that represent traveling to Mecca and visiting Kaaba.

After the last pilgrim, the Prophet Muhammed knows that the end of his life is near. His life was dedicated to spreading the faith and calling people to Islam. All that he left behind is true Islam, an Islam that many people misunderstand today. The Islam that Muhammed represents to the world was Islam full of salvation, humanity, peace, and purity. The very concept of Islam is impossible not to associate with Muhammad. The Prophet was a man who did not stand out in any way physically from other people, he did not wear lavish clothes, he was always calm and clean, very fond of body cleanliness, as well as everything around him. He never raised his voice but spoke a lot through his behaviour. He led a very simple life, never complaining, even at the end of his life when he was in huge pains. He was never abusive to bullies, even when they were abusive to him. If we had to explain the religion of Islam, the simplest way would be to talk about the life of the Prophet and his actions. And this is the real picture of Islam, not a long beard, not niqab or hijab, but your behavior, your manners, how you treat people, that is what makes you a real Muslim, everything after that counts.

2.1.1. Holy Quran

In order to clarify the beliefs of Muslims, we present the Quran as the main source of all rules and directions, according to Muslims must live. The authenticity of the Quran has often been questioned, which is why in this chapter we will offer some of our found evidence of the authenticity of this Holy Book.

During the revelation of this Holy Book, the Prophet Muhammed was facing with a frequent accusation that verses of Quran are a lie, and non-believers have often requested a sign as a proof of the truth. In the following verse, the Prophet was ordered to show the Quran in response to their requests, and the following verse was published: *“And is it not sufficient for them that We revealed to you the Book which is recited to them? Indeed, in that is a mercy and reminder for a people who believe”* (Quran, S. 29:51).

As evidence to the people who do not believe the Quran is God's words, and to the people who claimed that Muhammad invented these verses, we can corroborate with the first part of this verse which says: *“...We revealed to you (Muhammed) the Book..”* (Quran, S. 29:51), so God revealed to Muhammad, to a person who did not know how to read or write nor did not attend school and had no education. How can an uneducated man say these verses?

As the next proof of the authenticity of this book, we present the following verses from the Quran: *“And you did not recite before it any scripture, nor did you inscribe one with your right hand. Otherwise, the falsifiers would have had [cause for] doubt”* (Quran, S. 29:48).

From this verse, we can see that Muhammad really was uneducated, because as we understand from the verse, he had not read anything else before nor he had not written anything by his own hand, so he was illiterate. Our opinion can be supported with the words of one of the greatest thinkers of the last century, Jules Masserman, who stated in his lectures in 1840 that, if Muhammad was an educated man, then there would be room for doubt that the Quran was not the Word of God. If he had been an educated man, then his enemies' doubts would have been that he had transcribed the Quran from the books of the Jews and the Christians (Deedat, S. 13-14), but Muhammad was uneducated and it was impossible to do.

In the Quran are consisted of all instructions and rules on how to live this life and prepare for another. First revelation from God to Muhammad were to read, to learn, to examine things in the name of God. Examining the first verses of this magnificent book, we can see that God did not specify just Muslim people, but He instead addressed to all humanity, to learn and educate yourself. Importance of this verse we can use today and look at the notion of education, how important it is today for a person to be educated, and to learn from day to day a new thing. And this is only one of the proofs of the impassability of this book. For example, in the Qur'an, there are answers for the smallest things, from relationships to God, your spouse, the justice system, to treatment towards your neighbors. For every situation in life, you can find a solution in this book.

2.2 ISLAMIC INTEGRATION IN AUSTRIA

Freedom of religion is a statutorily guaranteed right in Austria, the legal foundation – starting with the Patents of Tolerance (ger. Toleranzpatent) on 1781/82 (Austria Patent No. 1781/82, 1781) – have been created over a period of about two centuries. Of great importance for the individual is the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience and creed (right to choose of religion) laid down in Article 14 of the Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals of 1867. This Article, in combination with the Law Regarding Inter-Confessional Relationships of 1868, guarantees every resident in Austria the right to join any church or the religious community by free choice, to leave such church or religious community at his/her own personal discretion or, finally, to abstain from belonging to any of them (The Austrian Federal Chancellery, 2011), so according to law, every Austrians, over the age of fourteen, are allowed to choose their religion, as well as change their beliefs.

Free exercise of religion and freedom of religion and conscience are guaranteed for everyone in Austria, regardless of whether a church or religious community is legally recognized or not or registered as a confessional community. All churches and religious communities in Austria enjoy special protection under the law: offenses such as the denigration of religious doctrines and the disturbance of a religious event are prosecuted

under criminal law; facilities and property dedicated to religious services enjoy enhanced protection under criminal law in cases of theft or wilful damage (Austrian Embassy, 2011).

When it comes to Islam, Austria legally recognized Islam as a state religion in 1912 and in 1979 it acknowledged the Islamic Religious Community in Austria (ger. Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, IGGiÖ) as the official representative for all Muslims in this country, by making that religious community equal as well as other legally recognized religious communities (i.e. Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish) (Sezgin, 2019, pp. 869-886).

In Austria, in the 1971 census survey, Islam as a religious denomination, was first included as a category which registered 0.3% of the population as Muslim. By the 1991 census, this number had increased to 2%, and in the 2001 census to 4.2%, when about 350,000 individuals designated Islam as their religious affiliation. According to the Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF), there were about half a million Muslims in 2009 in Austria, constituting approximately 6% of the country's population, whereas this number had increased to 700,000 Muslims in 2017, representing about 8% of the population (Janda & Vogl, 2010).

As we mentioned, Islam is legally recognized in Austria with Islam Law of 1912 (ger. Islam-Gesetz 1912) placing Muslims equal (lat. de jure) to the followers of other officially recognized religious communities and formed the legal basis for recognition of the Islamic community as a corporation of public law (Koglmann, 1999, pp. 315-336), so that means that Muslims have obtained the right to publicly practice their beliefs (like building mosque), which was a huge step for the Muslim community in Austria back then.

During World War I and the end of the Habsburg Monarchy, efforts to institutionalize Islam were halted. with the founding and development of the Islamic Cultural League, an Islamic non-governmental organization (NGO) in 1932, Islam flourished again. However, after Austria was annexed by Nazi Germany, this organization was suspended (Heine, Lohlke, & Potz, 2012). During the short period from 1943 to 1948, was founded another Islamic NGO, the Islamic Community of Vienna, and the end of the Second World War, the Association of Muslims in Austria came into being. However, the organizations did not play an active role in the institutionalization of Islam but mainly dealt with religious and charitable issues. (Bihl, 1991).

After a long period, in 2015, the Austrian Parliament announces an amendment to Islamic law (an amendment to Islamic law that was already passed in the time of the Habsburg-monarchy), stating that the purpose of the amendment is to protect the freedom of Muslims to practice their religion freely in Austria. As the main reason they named that

after more than 100 years have passed now, the creation of modern law is called for. It is to use termini adapted to today's teachings and jurisprudence, including the modern understanding of legal provisions concerning religious matters and at the same time concern itself with the specifics of the Religious Societies (The Federal Ministry Republic of Austria, 2015). The main drivers for amending this law, among others, were strong immigration of Muslims, which led to the fact that Muslims in Austria today make up 8% of the total population, making them the second-largest religious group in the country (Janda & Vogl, 2010).

2.3 ISLAMIC INTEGRATION IN SLOVENIA

When we talk about the first occurrences of Islam in Slovenia, we must mention the first generations of Muslims and therefore Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina who emigrated from Bosnia and moved to Slovenia with the aim of a better standard of living. The majority of the Muslim living population in Slovenia, are from Bosnia and therefore exist two main reasons.

Most Muslims began settling in Slovenia predominantly in the 1970s as labour migrants from other republics of Yugoslavia. Another significant influx of Muslims was in the 1990s, when refugee fled war-torn Yugoslavia (Górak-Sosnowska, 2011, p. 310). The wars in collapsing Yugoslavia of the 1990s resulted in a number of refugees settling in Slovenia, a significant portion of them being Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina, some from Kosovo. The second factor was the fall of socialisms and the consequent change in state-church relations, which contributed to people expressing their religious feelings more openly (Bajt, 2009, p. 307). Namely, coming to the territories of Slovenia, Bosnian Muslims were formed so-called "organization" during Ramadan in 1962 (Pasic, 2002, p. 102), where a few Muslims gathered to pray in this holy month. After a certain time, this group of several people grew to 100,200, 300 people and so expanded day by day. The idea that Muslims needed a place to perform their religious duties had already crystallized at that time and in the same year the *reis ul-ulema*⁴ Naim Hadziabdic of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent a request to the Ljubljana municipal authorities to determine a location for the establishment of a *mosque*⁵. At that time, according to data from the archives of the Islamic Community in Slovenia, around 3,000 Muslims were lived in Slovenia (Pasic, 2002, p. 105). Up to the 1990s, Islamic communities were registered in only Ljubljana in Jesenice, where the two first masjid was established. During the war in Bosnia and

⁴ The title of religious leader of the Islamic community.

⁵ The object where the prayer is performed or a so-called mosque.

Herzegovina, the first *imams*⁶ came to Slovenia with the refugees. Religious activities became more organized and attendance increased steadily (Kalcic, 2007, pp. 7-29).

The Islamic Community in Slovenia (slo. Islamska skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji) is one of 40 religious' communities in Slovenia registered at the Office for Religious Communities. Although it is beginning data back in the 1960s, it was only officially entered into the register in 1976 (Pasic, 2002, p. 108). After the fall of Yugoslavia (1991/92) the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia also disintegrated the "political seams". Up to then, the Slovenian community was a party of the largest unit with the most members within the Islamic Community of the SFRY⁷, which was called the Eldership of Islamic Community for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. On 18 December 1994, the Islamic Community in Slovenia "declared independence" and became an external unit of the newly formed Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which established its own Meshihat⁸ in Ljubljana (Valenta, 2011, pp. 163-175).

Unlike Austria, Slovenia has not yet recognized Islam as a religion and as a result, there are very few reliable sources on the number of Muslims in the country. According to 2011 data, from the book *Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: Widening the European discourse on Islam* by Polish economist Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, we found the statistics that the number of Muslims increased sharply through the period. Namely, the share of Muslims in Slovenia rose significantly between the two latest population registration; while their recorder number in 1991 was 29,361 and their share 1.5%, according to the latest 2002, census 47,488 people or 2,4% of the respondents who choose a religious affiliation are of the Islamic faith. This makes Islam a second-largest religion in a two-million country, where 58% or just over a million inhabitants are Catholic adherence (Górak-Sosnowska, 2011, p. 307).

Although there are no surveys on the diversity of Slovenia's Muslim population, there are evident linguistic and ethnic differences among them, since they are not only Bosniaks but also, Albanians, Roma, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Slovenians, etc. Also, several Muslims from African and Middle Eastern countries, most of whom came to study in times of Yugoslavia, settled in Slovenia, and in recent years asylum seekers from states with predominantly Muslim populations (e.g. Iraq, Iran, Turkey, some former Soviet republics), yet these represent a small minority (Bajt, 2009, p. 224).

⁶ The person who leads prayers in a mosque.

⁷ SFRY- Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

⁸ The highest religious and administrative body of Muslim community.

3 ISLAMOPHOBIA

When we read a term that ends with a phobia, initially a kind of threat or fear of something is formed in our head. It is naturally that we have this feeling that phobia means “that something is not right”, but if you added another world such as Islam, people have already prejudiced that Islam is also something that is not right. So, when we imagine hearing or reading daily about this term Islamophobia, people will eventually get used to, and over the time, they will adopt their own definition of Islamophobia, that’s way, we would like to explain on the right way, how the term Islamophobia even emerge and what means in that time. When we look at the first decade of Islamophobia, we will come across on the landmark publication of the highly influential report entitled, *Islamophobia: a challenge for us all*: report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (The Runnymede Trust Commission, 1997). Of course, this is not when the phenomenon of Islamophobia began: it was merely the year in which the first major report was published. Since then, Islamophobia has gained a far greater prevalence across both the public and political spaces. In the most vocal instances, claim and counter claim to Islamophobia typically emerges from bi-polar extremes, from those who decry and denounce any criticism whatsoever of Muslims or Islam as being ‘Islamophobic’ to those who actively and openly espouse a vitriolic hatred: both sides basing their views on a multitude of different causes and justifications. Between these poles a much broader and diverse range of far less obvious and explicit issues and incidents exist (Chris, 2016, p. 3).

There is still debating about origin of the term Islamophobia, even though many believe that British people had used first this term, but on the other side Oxford English Dictionary assuming that American press *Insight* in 1991, first used this term (Chris, 2016, p. 5), however other sources indicate that has actually happened in France. Whatsoever, the real question is how Islamophobia is defined. In the article about causes and prevention of Islamophobia, Mehtic and Pehlic stipulating their own definition and therefore that Islamophobia is an expression of intolerance, hatred, and hostility to Islam and Muslims and exercise discrimination against persons, individually or collectively, because they are Muslims, or are perceived as such, regardless of their form and with what intensity hatred, intolerance, and discrimination expressed and performed (Mehtić & Pehlić, 2013, p. 9). This definition precisely indicates discrimination against Muslims and Islam.

On the other side, defining Islamophobia become something a legitimate and tangible entity or as a series of different or overlapping conceptual or otherwise phenomena (Chris, 2016, p. 20), or easier say it, it something that is obvious and do not need to drag some much attention on it. For example, Marcel Maussen during Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Mobilization event about discourse, policies and violence in Paris said:

“‘Islamophobia’ groups together all kinds of different forms of discourse, speech and acts, by suggesting that they all emanate from an identical ideological core, which is a ‘fear’ or a ‘phobia’ of Islam. However, we should distinguish between different kinds of discourse, for instance between academic discussions on the relations between Islam and modernity, public discussions on whether Islam recognizes the principle of separation of state and church, public outcries about Islam as ‘a backward religion’ or as a ‘violent religion’, and the forms of hate speech one can find on internet forums and in newspapers, such the speech of the late Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who systematically called Muslims ‘goatfuckers’. It may well be that these different kinds of discourse and speech are related and feed into one another, but we cannot simply equate them all and treat them as comparable illustrations of a core ideology named ‘Islamophobia’ ” (Maussen, *Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Mobilization in the Netherlands.*, 2006).

We will have still a problem in the future to declare what is Islamophobia and what is not. As long as the previous author claim that Islamophobia is something that is multifarious and wide-ranging, we will always have a problem. He points out that Islam, their backward beliefs, and violent acts are to blame for the notion of Islamophobia. Using other words, Islam should adopt to every request that the country or community requires in order to be accepted, but that not goes like that. Islam stays by its own pillars and they cannot be changed or adjusted.

3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA

The recognition of Islam by Austria is a result of a specific historical development. It was not Islam that came to Austria, but it was Austria that came to Islam, or more precisely to Bosnia. Austria occupied Bosnia in 1878. Consequently, the occupying forces created all those structures surrounding Islam, which still today represent characteristics of Bosnian Islam, like that of the *reis ul-ulema*, for example (Schmidinger, 2012, p. 116). In Austria, the unique status of Islam is not the result of the immigration of Muslim workers in the 1960s and 1970s but is, in fact, the result of a historic relationship between Austria and the Balkan states, in particular with Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kroissenbrunner, 2003, pp. 375-394). The end of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1918 did not bring any changes to this specific judicial situation, except for the loss of the subjects of the Islamic Religious Community through the detachment of Bosnia. From then on, this law was more or less dormant until May 2, 1979, when the creation of an Islamic Religious Community in Austria (ger. *Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, IGGiÖ*) was permitted. The demand of the first president Ahmad Abdelrahimsai of the IGGiÖ of representing all “members of Islam [...] who are residing in Austria” (Schmidinger, 2012, p. 117) was accepted by the head of

law and by the public. Since then the Islamic Religious Community in Austria demands full rights to speak for all Muslims in Austria, regardless of if they pay their membership fees or not (Schmidinger, 2012, p. 117).

So, Austria allows Islam to be part of their society, expressing the whole situation as something noble, but the real picture is actually the whole opposite. Austrian politicians claim that their “solution” of recognition of Islam, presents as a role model for other European countries which one did not yet recognize Islam, but in reality, that was a great plan to manipulate with all Muslims in one Community. “Austria is a centrally organized corporatist state. In fact, it is often thought of as having the ‘strongest’ corporatist institutions in Europe “(Wiarda, 1997, p. 73), in order to satisfy collective interests within society, the Austrian state can license (if not create) corporate entities defined by occupational, functional, ethnic or religious identity; can structure these entities and incorporate them into the state system and, can grant these entities representational monopoly and other rights and responsibilities (Sezgin, 2019, pp. 868-886), so we can conclude that Austria has more advantages of this recognition than Islam itself. Even though Islam is recognized as an official religion and Muslim community is established, unfortunately, this cannot guarantee the social acceptances of Muslims in Austria.

In Austria in 2015, according to the first anti-Muslim racism report, there were 156 assaults against Muslims (Dokumentationsstelle für Muslime in 2015, 2016), only in 95% of incidents women were the main target, while as many as 40% had verbal attacks, 12% were physical attacks, and 5% involved discrimination. Women who were dressed in Muslim traditional clothing with a hijab on their head, with the aim of looking for a job, were the particular targets of public insults and discrimination. In addition, Austrian security authorities recorded 1156 criminal acts committed by right-wing extremist, xenophobic/racist, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic groups in 2015, as compared with 750 in 2014, an increase of 54.1% (BVT (Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung), 2016).

Intentionally media are a huge part of this parade. Every day we can see that the media is trying to portray every step of Muslims as the wrong one. It is not that hard, because they have a strong support of Austrian politicians. Especially, of the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ). Observing the history of this campaign, we collected data, that indicates on fact, when FPÖ started a campaign against migrants (ger. Ausländerwahlkampf), and portraying Islam and Muslims in terrible way, the campaign was one the rise. They succeed to spread fear and trembling against Muslims among the Austrians. Since then, FPÖ as a clever campaign uses Islamophobia as a mayor strategy in an attempt to win the next elections.

Moreover, we already mentioned the announcement of the Islamic Law in 2015, where the Austrian government-regulated again the rights of Muslims. What was the real purpose of this new law? Even though a huge number of Muslims immigrated to Austria, yet the number of Muslims is not bigger than 8% of the total Austrians population (Janda & Vogl, 2010), so that cannot be a reason for announcing new law. Next, no other religion is regulated with such a law, which makes Islam incompatible with other religions in Austria. Moreover, announce the ban of receiving founding outside of Austria, aiming precisely at Turkey and Saudi Arabia, but quite opposite, other religions are more than welcome to receive founding form Moscow, United State and etc. In their defence, they believe if they freeze foreign funding, they will encourage Islam to grow independently in Austria. But since then, things get even worse. Government announcing an even stronger fight against migration and asylum seekers. Afterward, the ban on the hijab and the burqa in middle school and for the women who work in the public sector. But none of this would happen without media pressure on Muslims and Islam, with the huge support of the Austrian government.

3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SLOVENIA

As early as 1969, the Muslims living in Slovenia made a request for a / mosque to be built in Ljubljana and they have been waited for permission for a long time. What fears of Islam torment Slovenian public to induce them to infringe on a basic constitutional right of their fellow citizens of Muslim faith? How well do Slovenians really know Islam, so that they feel comfortable making judgments and taking up positions that bear a consequence on the interrelationship between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations, to the point of fomenting intolerance? And what are the members of the Islamic Religious Community in Slovenia able and willing to do to establish a better dialogue with the wider public (Zalta, 2009, p. 115)?

More or less, Slovenian have the same attitudes toward Muslims like the rest of Europe. The period between 2000 and 2001 saw the emergence of the so-called 'immigrant crisis', when 'an explicitly stigmatizing and discriminatory media discourse on illegal immigrants gained ground in Slovenia' (Jalušič, 2001, p. 13). At the beginning of the migration, migrants have often called "others" or "illegal" and were generally unaccepted of the Slovenian society. Negative and intolerance reactions of Slovenian society toward migrants have an impact on the appearance of topics related to migration in Slovenian media. Year by year, Slovenian society make up their own picture about migrants and also about everything that comes with migration, including their religion. We cannot blame Slovenians for having bad impress of migrants as so of Islam. Back then, migrants were people who are crossing the border illegally, they were all relatively young and without any goals, they would live anywhere, including detention camps, just to stay and survive in this county. But today,

people that Slovenians still call migrants, are young, educated people, seeking for better living standards. They have rights and they know that, as they have the right to study and work in foreign countries, they also have the right to believe in any religion and rights to express their beliefs. So, the problem starts when people know their rights and they fought for them. Muslims in Slovenia know they have the right to be Muslim and to have a place where would they perform their religious activities. The Islamophobia problem in Slovenia attracts the wide public, including other European countries. How can Muslims have in any other country their own multiple places called mosque for performing prayers, but in Slovenia, they have only one and for that one, they waited so long? If we take a look on data, that we already mention, that the share of Muslims in Slovenia rose significantly between the two latest population registration; while their recorder number in 1991 was 29,361 and their share 1.5%, according to the latest 2002, census 47,488 people or 2,4% of the respondents who choose a religious affiliation are of Islamic faith. This makes Islam a second-largest religion in a two-million country, where 58% or just over a million inhabitants are Catholic adherence (Górak-Sosnowska, 2011, p. 307). So, we came up with calculations, if 58% of inhabitants are Catholic adherence, approximately 1. 153,626 Catholics (according to the latest 2002 census), we estimate they are 3000 Catholic churches in Slovenia, if we do the math, we will get 378 Catholics per a church. Using the same method for Muslims in Slovenia, we get a number that roughly said that for the current ration of Muslims, should be over 100 mosques or places for performing prayer. But they have only one. So where is the equality?

Speaking further, we came cross on facts that anti-Muslim attitudes in Slovenia are tied with Islamophobia that arising after 9/11. Even though this is related to the “war on terror” dictum that stigmatizes as violent and dangerous all Muslims on account of a few extremists, the Slovenian Islamophobia originates from a different source. Rather than being a response to Islamic fundamentalism, it has a longer history: it is “a reaction to the failure of compulsive assimilation” (Dragoš, 2004, p. 11). Knowing the fact, that the greatest number of Muslims in Slovenia originated from Bosnia, they were also automatically connected with their ethnicity, because of historical position of Bosnia, as a poor country with low economic growth. This was common at the beginning of the emergence of Islamophobia, which was evolved during various discriminations acts, but after all these years, and after all attempts, to assimilate Muslims into the society of Slovenia, to this day we still have strong signs that Islamophobia is still present in Slovenia, especially if we look at the position of the Bosnian Muslims in social, political and economic positions.

4 MEDIA

Media of mass communication are one of the main drivers of globalization and have become a key organizing factor in the everyday lives of people in the developed world. Yet mass media have existed for less than 150 years (Aldridge, 2007, p. 5). Today, the media is one of the main tools to use as a connection to the outside world. We can look at the media from two sides, one side is the side of the reader and the other side is the writers. We, as average readers, that is, people who have no influence on things that are published, profit in this way to obtain the desired information from the media. People who create media material, on the other hand, profit in many ways. One way is that they can manipulate the population with news that is not true and, on the other hand, also have the power to constantly publish inaccurate information because it is sponsored by a party with strong capital, in our case political parties. Renowned British communication theorist and professor Denis McQuail has been working on this topic for many years. In his 6th edition of McQuail's Mass Communications Theory, he defines the media in three ways:

In respect of politics, the mass media provide:

An arena of debate and a set of channels for making policies, candidates, relevant facts and idea more widely known as well as providing politicians, interest groups and agents of government with a means of publicity and influence (McQuail, 2010, p. 4).

In respect of culture, the mass media are:

For most people the main channel of cultural representation and expression, and primary source of image of social reality and materials for forming and maintaining social identity. Everyday social life is strongly patterned by the routines of media and infused by its contents through the way leisure time is spend, lifestyles are influenced, conversations is given its topic and models of behaviour are offered for all contingencies (McQuail, 2010, p. 4).

And in respect of economic:

The media had grown in economic value, with even larger and more international media corporations dominating the media market, with influence extending through sport, travel, leisure, food and clothing industries and with interconnections with telecommunications and all information-based economic sector (McQuail, 2010, pp. 4-5).

Therefore, as well as allowing the communication of messages or texts between senders and receivers, the mass media need to be seen in terms of their public character and in respect of their political, cultural, social and economic importance. The extracted reading by McChesney (1999) below stresses the important role that media can (and should)

play in ensuring the existence of a democratic society. Media professionals working in the media industries produce media products, which are increasingly seen as commodities to be bought and sold in globalized marketplace. Many of these products and texts have significance in the day-to-day life of many audience members in different parts of the globe. The texts may be a primary source of information and knowledge about the social world and most significantly about relationship of power. Media texts have further potency in the way in which cultural and political differences are constructed and defined. The experience of living in the modern and postmodern societies is defined primary by the very existence of the media. Our understanding of the media than must go further than a narrow technical definition of the media as the medium of communication between senders and receivers, or readers and writers (Devereux, 2013, S. 15).

Above all, the power of the media came from observing the effect of the media itself. The emergence of media as a type of information for citizens had many benefits for both citizens and people who knew how to use every situation to their advantage. The influence of the media on important decisions in the country, such as the election or popularity of certain parties, is not something that appeared yesterday in Austria or Slovenia. Namely, newspaper circulation in the USA peaked in 1910, although it happened a good deal later in Europe and other part of the world. The press was mainly founded by commercial advertising its content was characterized by sensational news stories and its control was often concentrated in the hand of powerful press “barons”. It was yet further reinforced by what happened in the Soviet Union and later in Nazi Germany, where the media were pressed into the service of propaganda on behalf of ruling party elites (McQuail, 2010, pp. 52-53).

Today, one of the most important things is that society needs to be able to distinguish true information from false information. One of the important things is that a person must view information from an objective standpoint and not allow certain media to influence his or her primary thinking about certain things. Although it seems harmless that people have been given access to various sources of information these days, on the other hand, it is difficult to have their opinion without being influenced by the media, which will be discussed in the next section.

4.1 ROLE AND IMPACT OF MEDIA ON SOCIETY

Speaking in general, consciously or unconsciously, the media has a powerful influence on human thinking. Today, the media is one of the easiest ways to educate, inform, or simply find out about the current happenings and it is just a click away. This is electronic way of obtaining information, beside this, media can be also in print version, including: newspapers, articles, books, etc. Furthermore, among young people, social media have the

biggest influence today. Today, almost everyone has access to a private social profile, which means that everyone has access to express their opinions, regardless of whether or not it is valid, which leads to "too much freedom of speech".

With the advent of new communication mediums, the frequency of media use is also increasing. Today a large population of our country uses communication tools on an hourly basis. Youth spends most of their time on social media exploring themselves on their interest fields. The young population of our country spends most of his or her time on the social sites like Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google + which includes the posting and sharing of content according to the interest and need of the social media user. The frequency of using media depends on the reach and access pattern of communication mediums (Singh & Pandey, 2007, p. 131).

One of the differences between televisions and social reporting (especially on social media) is that social networks have progressed so rapidly that they have skipped some of the stages that television or radio broadcasting had to go through. Social media has adapted so quickly to other forms of reporting such as television, radio, magazine reporting, etc. in a way that is most appealing to the younger generation. Everything has become accelerated and at your fingertips, which makes important information equal to other irrelevant ones and does not allow them to float "to the surface".

How do the media generally affect people, especially when making important life decisions such as education, work, family, or even vote in elections, we only see the impact when we reduce the use of media in our daily lives. Although many studies have been conducted on how the media primarily affect the psychological state of a person, the complete cessation of the use of the media is not a solution, but simply a choice of information that we ourselves want to obtain. In our work, one of the goals is to find out how the media affect the population of Austria and Slovenia by imposing information on them with specific goals.

4.1.1. The role of the media in Austria

When it comes to the population of Austria and one of the problems in the country, namely Islam and the rise of Islamophobia, the Austrian government plans professionally how to communicate with the media. Everything is planned in advance, when and to whom the information will be delivered, with the aim of shaping the public discourse. Government adoption and political approval of anti-Muslim law in Austria are reflected in media coverage and therefore by spreading hate speech in public newspapers and it leads only to increasing the attacks on Muslims and their religion.

Islamophobic attacks in Austria increased significantly compared to last year, according to a report published by an organization in Austria. A total of 309 attacks against Muslims in 2017 rose by 74 percent to 540 in 2018, according to the Anti-Muslim Racism Report 2018 released by Dokustelle, an organization that documents cases of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism. Attacks against Muslim women account for 83 percent of the total number of Islamophobic attacks in Austria, according to the report. Most of the racist attacks were carried out on digital media with 53 percent, the report said. This rate was 31 percent in public places, five percent in educational institutions and three percent in working life, it added (Kiyagan, 2019).

As we can see, using media is one of the common ways of expressing hate speech. Almost everyone today has access to the Internet, so almost everyone has access to publish any content that is full of hate speech. Content published by one person can be removed, but when it comes to the state-run tabloid with the highest circulation per day, we know that there is something more than just hate speech. This is exactly the example of Austria's *Kronen Zeitung* newspaper, which published in 2017 a newspaper with the cover "Close Borders for Muslims" (Kronen Zeitung, 2017).

Beside *Kronen Zeitung*, various Right-wing media, such as outlet *Wochenblick* published various articles on topic Islamization of society. The article states, "Rehabilitation in Austria: Woman Has to Submit to Islamic Prayer Times" (Wochenblick, 2018). (see **Picture 2**)

The Oberösterreichischen Nachrichten (engl. Upper Austrian Daily) reported to be shocked that mosques were still open, thus blindly following the government's propaganda (Ichner, 2018). Some journalists argued not only to ban the hijab in kindergarten, but also for teachers, since the hijab can "question social achievements" (Neues Volksblatt, 2018). The *Kronen Zeitung* also argued that a mosque belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood (Budin, 2018), which was not true. The author Necla Kelek also supported the government's hijab ban (Kelek, 2018). Nina Scholz defended the government in *Der Standard* and argued why a ban of the hijab was necessary, while the ban of the Jewish kippah was not (Scholz, 2018).

Other media outlets such as *Biber* gave a voice to Muslims, showing the kind of discrimination they are suffering under the current circumstances (Stanić & Mohamed, 2018). *Mosaik* interviewed teachers to give a picture contrary to the one spread by Susanne Wiesinger (Draxler & Ahmed, 2018). Also, political scientists, Muslim and Christian theologians, religious studies scholars, anthropologists, scholars of law, historians and a scholar of Jewish philosophy were given space to dissent with the widespread anti-Muslim policies (Bayraklı & Hafez, 2019, pp. 115-116).

All of these newspapers are sponsored by right-wingers, which means that they decide who will, what will and where will news be published and with that they have an impact on society and shape their thoughts. So, this means that right-wingers, in collaboration with certain media, have an indirect power to decide who people will vote for in the election.

Picture 1: An example of hate speech in a newspaper Kronen Zeitung



Source: (Kronen Zeitung, 2017)

Picture 2: An example of hate speech in a newspaper Wochenblick



Source: (Bayraklı & Hafez, 2019)

4.1.2. The role of the media in Slovenia

When we talk about the media in Slovenia, and if we look back at 2016 on the emergence of the so-called migrant crisis, the fear of Islamization, with the most prominent

Islamophobic content, was *the Reporter* journal and therefore, this journal published various articles that were of a discriminatory nature.

The article, which contains hate speech, is signed by J.B., and bears the quotation that “Islam is a criminal ideology that deserves to be included in the same category as Nazism, fascism and communism – It is contrary to the principles of European law, and it should be, like its predecessors, overcome - the West must crush Islam if it wants to survive.” The article was published on the website of *the Reporter* on 23 May 2016 (Bayraklı & Hafez, European Islamophobia report 2016, 2017, p. 540). The same author develops similar claims in an article entitled “Ljubljana on the way to Islamization: a crescent moon is fixed on the minaret.” The article was published in the *Reporter* on 30 May 2016. In the article, texts owner writes that the Ljubljana Islamic Religious and Cultural Centre will become “a hotbed of radicalization and terrorism” (Bayraklı & Hafez, European Islamophobia report 2016, 2017, p. 540).

After several months, the same writer also publishes a third article in the same journal, entitled "Meet Ljubljana's First Sharia Ghetto?" and is subtitled "A new residential neighbourhoods will grow near the mosque. Experience from Europe shows that such neighbourhoods are populated mostly by Muslims and are where terrorists find shelter." This article talks about the expansion, in the future, of the Muslim population in Ljubljana, which will allegedly terrorize the people of this city to force them to embrace Islam and its lifestyle (Bayraklı & Hafez, European Islamophobia report 2016, 2017, p. 540). Beside the journal *the Reporter*, the right-wing newspaper *Demokracija* has a news chapter entitled “Migrations” (slo. migracije) under which they publish various material and news regarding migration and migrants and depict them as a violent threat to Slovenia. They represent migration as an Islamic invasion (Demokracija, 2018). They spoke about fictitious violence against Muslim women's children and forcing Muslim rituals, also about illegal arrivals of migrants from war zones and etc.

Beside this, on 29 August 2018, they publish cover which shows a bust of a white woman grabbed by black hands, with the caption on the cover:” Along with migrants comes a culture of rape to Slovenia”. (see **Picture 5**) This is not only about the fact that the cover picture objectively shows racial hatred, because rape is associated with black migrants, but also about the perception of women in these societies. In additional, the cover hints at the arrival of migrants with their rape culture. What then should an average Slovenian think of this so-called culture of rape of migrants coming from Islamic countries? Nothing but fear, trembling and disgust for such Muslims as for that culture and religion called Islam. This cover is unfortunately just one of many attempts to disparage Islam and portray this religion as perverted, full of violence, bloody killing, raping, belittling women, and so on,

leading to an increase in Islamophobia among Slovenes and thus increasing the rate of Islamophobia in the country, with help from the media.

Picture 3: An example of Islamophobia on the front page of Slovenian Democracy newspaper



Source: (Demokracija, 2018)

Nova24TV's (Slovenian right-wing news media) columnist Bernard Brščič wrote about the idea of affiliation of Islam in Europe, more precisely about the incompatibility of Islam and Europe. Namely, the original idea of Islam in Europe was stated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and that Islam should be an integral part of both German culture and European culture. Brščič responded like this:

“Islam does not belong to Germany, does not belong to Europe and does not belong to Slovenia. European Islam is a contradiction in terms. Islam and Europe are separate and incompatible concepts in values. [...] Europeanness means denial of Islam. [...] Muslims do not demand subordination from themselves and their associates, but from all of us. [...] Islam is consequently in war with all great religions, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism. [...] The freedom that we enjoy and is guaranteed by the liberal-democratic system is threatened by Islam. This is not just about pursuing the ideals of the

Enlightenment, such as secularism, freedom of speech, democratic decision-making, equality of men and women, the arbitrariness of sexual orientation, but also about trivial things, such as the right to enjoy pork sausages, ham or Kranjska sausage, drink refošk or cviček, or the right to freely stray dogs accompanied by uncovered women” (Brščič, 2018).

In addition to various media reports, websites are also flooded with hate speech. Some of these pages are: Radical Ljubljana (slo. Radikalna Ljubljana); Stop Islamisation of Slovenia (slo. Stop islamizaciji Slovenije); Generation Identity Slovenia (slo. Generacija identitete Slovenija); Slovenia Secure Borders (slo. Slovenija Zavaruj Meje); Slovenian Militia (slo. Slovenska milica); and We do not want refugees and migrants in Slovenia, we do not want a mosque in Ljubljana (slo. Nočemo beguncev in migrantov v Sloveniji, Nočemo džamije v Ljubljani) (Bayraklı & Hafez, European Islamophobia report 2016, 2017, p. 540). The posts on their Facebook pages are offensive and use images of animals, such as pigs, which are not allowed to be eaten in Islam.

Picture 4: The example of dehumanization of Muslims on Social Networks



Source: (Bayraklı & Hafez, European Islamophobia report 2016, 2017)

5 IMPACT OF MEDIA ON ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA

In this part of the diploma thesis, we turn to a practical example of media influence using the analysis of the 2017 Austrian parliamentary elections. Specifically, our aim is to show how much politicians have appeared in the media, how many people, potential voters, watched the elections, and how they used the media and Islamophobic content in the media to win elections and spread fear and trembling among the Austrian population in order to present their party as ideal as a safeguard for the Austrian people against Islam and Islamization. Before moving on to the practical part, let us briefly explain how the political world in Austria functions.

5.1 POLITICAL SYSTEM OF AUSTRIA

Austria is a democratic republic. The territory of the Federal Republic consists of nine federal states or provinces (ger. Bundesland, Land; plural: Bundesländer, Länder). Vienna is the federal capital and the seat of the supreme federal authorities. Since 1995, Austria is a member state of the European Union. Five political parties are currently represented in the Austrian Parliament: the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Greens and the NEOS (The Austrian Federal Government, 2020).

For our analysis, we will use only three main winning parties in Austrian Parliamentary election in 2017, so a brief idea of them:

1. ÖVP- The Christian conservative Austrian People's Party- with more than 600.000 members the Austrian People's Party is the biggest party in Austria. In six associations (youth, women, entrepreneurs, employees, farmers, senior citizens), organized in nine province and 116 district branches, they work for the party in all 2098 communities of Austria (ÖVP, 2019).
2. FPÖ- The Freedom Party of Austria- is a right-wing populist party in Austria, which is represented in the National Council, in all nine state parliaments and many local councils. She describes herself as a representative of the "Third Camp" and sees herself in the heritage of the national-liberal value system of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1848 (FPÖ, 2019).
3. SPÖ- The Social Democratic Party of Austria has been fighting since the beginning for a better life for the people. A party with a wide offer for all who want a fair, social and democratic Austria. For us, there are so many in the centre who it does not always have easy in life - not the few who can do it (SPÖ, 2019).

In a manner of election, all political institutions established by the Constitution derive their powers either directly or indirectly from elections by secret, personal and equal ballot. Austrian citizens elect the:

- the National Assembly (ger. Nationalrat, the people's chamber of Parliament) – every five years,
- the Provincial Parliament (ger. Landtag, Parliament of a Province) – every five or six years,
- the Municipal Council (EU citizens resident in the municipality can also vote) – every five or six years,
- the Austrian Members of the European Parliament (citizens of other EU countries with their main residence in Austria have the right to vote)
- The Federal President – every six years. (The Austrian Federal Government, 2020)

Other instruments of democracy are the referendum or plebiscite (ger. Volksbefragung, Volksabstimmung, Volksbegehren). All Austrians (and some citizens of other EU member states) who reach age 16 before the appointed date can vote (The Austrian Federal Government, 2020).

5.1.1. The Parliament

The Austrian Parliament consists of two chambers: The National Assembly (ger. Nationalrat) and the Federal Council (ger. Bundesrat). The National Assembly is the main legislative body. The preparation and implementation of legislation takes place in the Federal Government or in the Provincial Governments. Legislative tasks are carried out at federal level by the National Assembly in conjunction with the Federal Council. The Federal Council represents the interests of the provinces in Parliament. Provincial Assemblies (ger. Landtage) represent the interests of citizens in the individual provinces. Each federal province is administered by a Provincial Government, which is headed by a Provincial Governor (ger. Landeshauptmann) elected by the respective Provincial Assembly (The Austrian Federal Government, 2020).

5.2 RESULTS OF AUSTRIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2017

Table 1 shows the results in the 2017 parliamentary elections showing that for the first time since 2002, the ÖVP became the strongest party with a vote share of 31.5% (+7.5 percentage points compared to 2013). The FPÖ achieved its second-best election result ever, winning 26% (+5.5 percentage points), and it only marginally lost the second place to the SPÖ. Combined, the ÖVP and FPÖ reached a comfortable majority of 57.4%, securing the largest vote share for parties of the center-right and radical-right in Austria. Both

parties gained votes in every Bundesland, with the largest gains in Carinthia, the region formerly governed by Jörg Haider, deceased leader of the FPÖ and later BZÖ. The SPÖ retained its all-time low vote share of 2013 with 26.9% (+0.04 percentage points), remaining the strongest party only in the traditional strongholds of the Bundesländer Vienna and Burgenland (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018).

Table 1: Results of Austrian Parliamentary Election 2017

PARTY	SEATS WON	VOTES	VOTE SHARE
Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)	62	1,595,526	31,5%
Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)	52	1,361,746	26,9%
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	51	1,316,442	26%

Source: (Election Guide, 2017)

5.2.1. The impact of media on results of Parliamentary election 2017

The issues of immigration, border control, anti-Islam, and the related topic was a major ideology of all three parties. Firstly, the victorious ÖVP party with 31% of vote share, led by Sebastian Kurz, can attribute his victory to his anti-immigration and anti-Muslim campaign, which blended perfectly with media content full of enemy stereotypes. Secondly, SPÖ has been one of the main backers of the FPÖ party in supporting the law to ban Muslim veils by covering their faces and tightening their immigration status. We can all agree that Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP) played really well in these elections. Namely, Kurz claimed during the election in 2015 that Islam is part of Austria (and we have proof of that, see **Picture 5**) that immigrants are an important part of Austrian society that helps the economy, etc. but the ÖVP party in 2015 election won a small percentage (24 percent). So, during the 2017 elections, Kurz had a new ideology, which is, surprisingly, almost identic to an ideology of FPÖ party (winning party in 2015), fight against “political Islam”.

Picture 5: FPÖsters as a fight against Islam



Source: (FPÖ, 2019)

The main question now is, what role did the media play in all these results? Now that we know, which goals did have these campaigns, now we will show what kind of tools did they use, and how often that they showed up on media. Firstly, the 2017 election campaign was marked by various changes. Even though TV advertisement of elections campaigns in Austria are legally banned, yet SPÖ announced that they will invest a significant amount of money on TV spots (statistics show that was 18% funds from the campaign fund). Furthermore, this campaign switches from posters around the country and instead invest in media and online tools. They use social media as an established means of campaigning. Each of the candidates had their private account on Facebook and above all, parties comprehensively used YouTube by releasing more than 500 videos in six campaign weeks. The public broadcaster ORF (ger. Österreichischer Rundfunk) continues to dominate the television market and played a major role in promoting the aims of these parties. ORF, which operates four TV channels, reached ten times as many viewers in 2015 as the most popular private channel, Puls 4, which is owned by the ProSiebenSat.1 media company. ORF is subject to political influence because the parties, via the broadcaster's board of trustees, are involved in the selection of its chairman (Press Freedom Index, 2018).

TV debates between pairs of top candidates are well-established events in Austrian campaigns and raise extensive attention among voters and journalists (Plasser, Fritz, & Günther, 2010, pp. 193-240). In 2017, ten pairwise debates organised by the public broadcasting company attracted on average more than 700,000 viewers (11% of the electorate). More than 1.2 million viewers (19% of the electorate) watched the final round

with all top candidates (OFR, 2017). It was the most extensive reporting so far that the ORF offered before a National Council election - with more than 72 hours of live interviews, analyses, TV discussions, reports and contributions on ORF television alone and around 500 reports in a total length of just under eleven hours to choose from in the ZiB programs in ORF 1 and ORF 2. Therefore, all citizens had the opportunity to be informed of these debates both in the public (ORF) as well on the two major private channels (Puls 4 and ATV).

"Round of Top Candidates" alone reached up to 1.409 million people interested in politics (on average 1.211 million with 41 percent market share, 39 percent in the target group 12-49 and 36 percent among 12- to 29-year-olds were there live via ORF 2) and was thus the most successful round since 2006 and by far the most-watched election 17 program on Austrian television (OFR, 2017), this means that 29 of the 30 broadest-reaching TV election formats for National Council election 2017 were shown on ORF. Of the 100 television minutes used by the public on Austrian TV channels for the election, 74 were attributable to ORF TV programs. More than two million Austrians saw the election duels exclusively on ORF (and none of the commercial competitors). With its election 17 confrontations, ORF also had the absolutely most viewers in all target groups.

The public interest in the run-up to election 17 was enormous: record numbers reached the "summer talks" with Tarek Leitner, which were held for the first time in an election year, at the beginning of ORF area code reporting. On average, 782,000 viewers saw the five debates with a 28 percent market share; in the young target group of 12-49 years, the market share was 21 percent (OFR, 2017), this made the "Summer Talks" 2017 the most viewed in the history of the series. The "summer talk" with Sebastian Kurz was the most viewed "summer talk" ever.

Table 2: The "summer talk" in chronological order

PARTY REPRESENTATIVE	PARTY	NUMBER OF VIEWERS	PERCENT OF MARKET SHARE
Heinz-Christian Strache	FPÖ	813.000	28%
Sebastian Kurz	ÖVP	1.073.000	35%
Christian Kern	SPÖ	943.000	30%

Source: (OFR, 2017)

From this we can see, in fact, how much the citizens were interested in elections 2017 and how many potential voters attracted party representatives with their goals and promises during the debates and public appearance. Up to 1.409 million Austrians saw the elections 17 "confrontations" with an average market share of up to 41 percent (OFR, 2017).

Table 3: TV confrontations in chronological order

PARTY REPRESENTATIVE	PARTY	NUMBER OF VIEWERS	PERCENT OF MARKET SHARE
Kern – Strache	SPÖ-FPÖ	887.000	27%
Kurz – Strache	ÖVP-FPÖ	904.000	28%
Kern – Kurz	SPÖ-ÖVP	970.000	31%

Source: (OFR, 2017)

Elections 17 was also a hit on social media in ORF: Facebook has more than 6 million video views and more than 1.2 million interactions to choose from on ORF's Facebook pages.

What does this all tell us? All the goals that these parties had anti-Muslim, anti-immigration, border protection, ban on wearing burqa for Muslim women, closing Muslim kindergartens, running Islamic centres, all these goals were stated on public television. All of these plans were heard throughout Austria and again most Austrians agreed to these goals. According to the Election Guide, the turnout rate was 79%, so which means 5,120,881 Austrians votes on these elections (Election Guide, 2017). 1,595,526 Austrians voted in favor of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), 1,361,746 Austrians voted in favor of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and 1,316,442 Austrians gave their vote for Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Although their ideologies were not backed up with strong evidence at the time, the parties used the media during the election as a constant reminder that life could be better for all Austrians if these parties' proposals were adopted, if we cast our vote for a better tomorrow, if we rely on these parties that in the future will save us from so-called political Islam, Muslims and their beliefs. And they obviously succeeded. Consciously or unconsciously, the media has a powerful influence on us and the media is one of the easiest ways to manipulate with humans, whether we admit it to ourselves or not.

6 IMPACT OF MEDIA ON ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SLOVENIA

Using a similar approach as we did for analysing of Parliamentary election in Austria 2017, we will use on example of media influencing on results of Parliamentary election in Slovenia 2018 by displacing appearance of political parties during the election on TV and Radio and how it affected the attitude towards migrants, therefore, Muslims coming to the country.

6.1 POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SLOVENIA

Slovenia is a parliamentary democratic republic with a proportional electoral system. In Slovenia power is vested in the people. All adult citizens of the Republic of Slovenia have the right to vote for representatives of the people in general, multi-party and free elections. Power is divided into the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The holder of the legislative branch is the parliament, which consists of the National Assembly and the National Council. Executive power is vested in the Government and judicial power is separated from both the legislative and the executive powers (Government Communication Office (GOV), 2019).

For our analysis, we will use only three main winning parties in Slovenian Parliamentary election in 2018, so a brief idea of them:

1. SDS- The Slovenian Democratic party- The key objective of the SDS is to create a new quality of life, more democracy, respect for human rights and mutual respect, economic efficiency, freedom and solidarity. The SDS stands for the society of free and active individuals, which accepts and protects the functioning of the free market while alleviating its social consequences (SDS, 2018).
2. SD- The Social Democrats- has a tradition of more than 150 years. It emerged as a political movement for social and political rights workers. Its key values are solidarity, justice and equality of all people. It has therefore been a leading ally of women in the fight for their political and social equality and a key political force in promoting universal human rights (SD, 2018).
3. LMS- The List of Marjan Sarec- wants to shape the future of the Slovenian state for the sake of the people. For the common good, for intergenerational coexistence, for Slovenian security, for nature conservation and for a clear view of the future (LMS, 2018).

6.1.1. The Parliament

The Slovenian Parliament is bicameral, composed of the National Assembly (slo. Državni zbor) and the National Council (slo. Državni svet). In the National Assembly, there are 88 representatives of political parties and two representatives of the Italian and Hungarian

national communities, elected by the people to represent their interests. Members of the National Council nominated and elected by different interest groups in society represent organised social interests and the interests of local communities. The National Assembly adopts amendments to the Constitution, laws, national programmes, declarations and resolutions. It also adopts its rules of procedure and the state budget, ratifies international treaties and calls referendums. The deputies in the National Assembly elect the Prime Minister and Ministers, the President and Vice-Presidents of the National Assembly and, on the proposal of the President of the Republic, also the Judges of the Constitutional Court, the Governor of the Bank of Slovenia and the Human Rights Ombudsman. There are 40 members of the National Council, of whom four are representatives of employers, four representatives of employees, four representatives of farmers, craftsmen and independent professions, six representatives of non-commercial activities and 22 representatives of local interests (Government Communication Office (GOV), 2019).

6.2 RESULTS OF SLOVENIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2018

From Table 4 we can see results of the Slovenian Parliamentary election in 2018, where we can see that the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) won with 24,92% of vote share headed by Janez Jansa, one of several Slovenian politicians who managed to hold the position for over 20 years. In the second place is a party with 12,60% of vote share or precisely 112,250 votes (double less than the winning party) The List of Marjan Sarec (LMS) in the leading position with Marjan Sarec. This party was founded in 2014, one month before the last national elections 2014 in June and has failed to reach the top 7 "winning" parties and now is in second place. In third place is a party with 9,93% of vote share, party named Social Democrats headed wit Dejan Zidan. Although this party ranks third, it boasts almost twice as many votes as it did in the last national election (5,98%) (Election Guide, 2018).

Table 4: Results of Slovenian Parliamentary Election 2018

PARTY	PARTY REPRESENTATIVE	SEATS WON	VOTES	VOTE SHARE
Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS)	Janez Jansa	25	222,042	24,92%
The List of Marjan Sarec (LMS)	Marjan Sarec	13	112,250	12,60%
Social Democrats (SD)	Dejan Zidan	10	88,524	9,93%

Source: (Election Guide, 2018)

6.2.1. The impact of media on results of Parliamentary election 2018

In the election campaign, some representatives from the winning party SDS used illiberal rhetoric on migration and civil society issues. SDS also used huge posters warning of a migrant invasion (see **Picture 6**) and promising to not allow a single migrant to enter the country. However, Janez Janša (SDS) himself played the role of an open-minded and accessible politician, offering hands of cooperation to everyone. In public appearances, he demonstrated great skills and experience, which the newcomers and many of his second league competitors simply did not have. By professional standards, the SDS campaign was much ahead of the others (Lovec, 2018, p. 5).

Picture 6: Slovenian Democratic Party on Migration



Source: (SDS, 2018)

Translation: Left-wings claim migration is a good thing. We say they are a danger.

Beside SDS posters, we already mention newspaper *Demokracija* and the statement by Nova24TV columnist about the incompatibility of Islam and Europe, especially in Slovenia, the questions are, what is the relationship between this type of media and politicians in the 2018 elections?

We are aware of the fact that political parties are dependent on the media and that they represent the fastest link between politics and society. As we have already presented, television played a key role in the 2017 Austrian elections, because television is a form of media that is understandable to anyone from illiterate, old people to children. In this case of Slovenian, the media law does impose rules aiming at the fair representation of political

viewpoints in news and informative programs on PSM (Public service media) channels and services; however, there is no designated body with effective enforcement powers that would overlook this representation. (Milosavljevic, Gerjevic, & Petkovic, 2018). In this specific case we present how often political parties appeared on TV during election 2018.

It is a well-known fact that the SDS manages the Nova24TV TV station and their content, which we are already familiar with, and also has the editorial support of the political journal *Report* and *Demokracija*, whose content we are also familiar with, and their attitude towards Islam and migration. And all three belong to the national level. Namely, before the Parliamentary election on 12 March of 2018 agency Parsifal- which does market research and opinion polling, did a survey for Nova24TV that shows that the vast majority of voters, more than 70% tend to vote for SDS, the party that allegedly has a program with concrete solutions. This is a logically concluded overblown analysis, as in this analysis more than 70% of citizens voted for the SDS party, while true parliamentary results on 3 June of 2018 show that only 24.92% of citizens voted for this party. This was an attempt of a psychological nature, showing the society in advance the results of how the majority voted, in order to give people a picture of the quality of that party since more than 70% of citizens would vote for that party. A similar model was used in Mexico during the corrupt government. What is important to emphasize here is that it was precisely the new 24TV that insisted on such an analysis and thus published it.

In this case, generally, television and radio play a major role, as a form of media, as the main source of information during the election. In addition to television coverage, regular elections were broadcast on Radio Slovenia mainly on the First Program - PRVI. Radio Slovenia has broadcasted five confrontations, which lasted an hour and a half and were broadcast live every Wednesday at 5 pm. Every Wednesday at 5 pm, various topics were discussed, from foreign policy, migrations to solving problems in Slovenian health. Debates of the parties could also be watched live via Facebook. Also, at 11.15 am every day, the First Program – PRVI announced the presentation of candidates and parties that will run in all constituencies.

Fresh results of public opinion polls were published every Friday, and at 4.30 pm on the First Program - PRVI, there was also an analysis of the candidates' activities from last week. The claims made by the candidates in the confrontations and presentations were also verified by the journalists of the Program PRVI of Radio Slovenia and confronted with facts and data.

Regarding television, Television Slovenia (RTV Slovenia) broadcast TV debates in the 2018 elections between presidents of all parties, parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties. The first, inaugural debate, was on Monday, May 7 of 2018 at 8 pm, when the campaign

also officially started on RTV Slovenia. Until June 1st, TV debates were held between party presidents, between parliamentary parties, interview with representatives of non-parliamentary parties, debates between non-parliamentary parties, interview with representatives of parliamentary parties.

Table 5: RADIO confrontations in chronological order

DATE	DEBATES	TIME	DURATION
9. May 2018	Confrontation of Presidents of all parties, parliamentary and non-parliamentary	5pm	1,5h
16. May 2018	Confrontation of representatives of parliamentary parties	5pm	1,5h
23. May 2018	Debate between representatives of non-parliamentary parties	5pm	1,5h
30. May 2018	Confrontation of parliamentarians	5pm	1,5h
31. May 2018	Last debate of the Presidents of all parties	5pm	1,20h

Source: (RTV SLO, 2018)

Table 6: TV confrontations in chronological order

DATE	DEBATES	TIME	CHANNEL
7. May 2018	Presidents of all parties, parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties	8pm	TV SLO 1
17. May 2018	Parliamentary parties	8pm	TV SLO 1
24. May 2018	Non-parliamentary parties	8pm	TV SLO 1
28. May 2018	Parliamentary parties	8pm	TV SLO 1
31. May 2018	The last debate of Presidents of all parties	8pm	TV SLO 1

Source: (RTV SLO, 2018)

As we presented in Slovenia at the time of the elections, the media were very aware of the parties and candidates. In addition to TV debates between parties, they also featured political activities, television commercials about parties, and political party self-representation. Why we take TV debates as an example of the impact on Islamophobia, especially in the time of election 2018? Well, during TV debates where candidates discuss among themselves, and in those moments of rapid discussion, they must be aware that they are responsible for their own answers, which should be made with reflection. One such example is the issue of foreign policy. Although the problem of migration in Slovenia is not as prevalent as in Austria, nonetheless, party representatives fought against mass migration and the spread of radical Islamization. The winning party SDS, during elections, was the first party to propose the establishment of surveillance in border areas. SDS deputies, during TV debates, also point out that migrant flows today represent the greatest security challenge for both Slovenia and the European Union. That is the only reason why the Government of the Republic of Slovenia should have prepared measures and solutions regarding migration flows, and the parliament has the right and duty to get acquainted with them. They also draw attention to the fact that the migrant crisis in the second half of 2015 and in the first months of 2016 hit the Republic of Slovenia completely unprepared. According to Members, this situation must not happen again.

Did all of this have an impact on Slovenians to go out and vote and how that reflected on their attitudes towards Muslims? Although, no data is available of the TV and Radio consumption in the elections 2018, summing up the facts, that in Slovenia live around 2 million people, according to the Election Guide, the turnout rate in the parliamentary elections in Slovenia was 52%, more precisely 901,457 votes (Election Guide, 2018). So, comparing this number with a number of votes just for winning party SDS, which was 222,042 (Election Guide, 2018), we can confirm the fact that SDS had some impact on Slovenians, along with their marketing campaign. They managed to convince the majority of Slovenes to go and vote, and therefore vote for their anti-migration policy and thus contributed to increasing the level of Islamophobia in the country, gaining a vote for such a party.

7 SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND SLOVENIA

Firstly, it is important to say that Islam is present in every European country. No country has a perfect system, but each has a different response to the presence of Islam in the state. Here is important to reflect on facts how these two counties behave towards Islam and how that reflected especially during elections in both countries.

Firstly, if we reflect on the legalizations of Islam in both countries, Austria legally recognized Islam as a state religion in 1912 and in 1979 it acknowledged the Islamic Religious Community in Austria. On the contrary, in Slovenia Islam is still not legally recognized, but there was established Islamic Community in Slovenia in the 1960s. When it comes to registered mosques, Austria till now boasts over 250 registered mosques and above all, four mosques exist with minarets, while Slovenia, after more than 50 years, in 2015 has allowed the Muslim community to build the first mosque in Ljubljana with a minaret that cannot be higher than 40 m. Although Austria had a good foundation for the stability of Islam in the country, fears of a sharp rise in Muslims in the country forced the government to change the 1912 Islamic law, by introducing new rules for Muslims and discriminating them comparing to other religions, in a particular, ban of receiving founding outside of Austria, aiming precisely at Turkey and Saudi Arabia, quite opposite, other religions are more than welcome to receive founding from Moscow, United State and etc. Meanwhile, in Slovenia, Muslims are still in the phase of integrating into Slovenian society.

When we talk about the legal forms of states and the elections themselves, type of regime in Austria is Representative democracy and with that type of government is Semi-presidential representative democracy. On the other side, Slovenia is Democratic Republic and form of government is parliamentary system. If we observe situation during elections, considering the fact that Austria and Slovenia are border neighbours, they had a lot in common during the Parliamentary elections. Due to the migrant crisis in the second half of 2015 and in the first months of 2016, that hits both of these countries, the issue of closing borders in both states was represented. Both countries had a strong anti-Islamic and anti-migration policy during the election campaign, the difference is that Austria had already taken some sanctions such as deceiving mosques, Islamic kindergartens, banning the wearing of the niqab, etc.

One of the main differences is that Austria has taken a much stricter approach in the fight against “political Islam,” and Muslims in general, is that the Muslim population in Austria makes up 8% of the total population. They have reached a point where anti-immigration policies are not effective because Muslims “multiply” within state borders. The government then turned to anti-Islamic policies, with the aim of manipulating already arrived Muslims

and their young generations. While on the other hand, Slovenia does not have such a huge number of Muslims, but with its anti-immigration policy it fights against the arrival of new Muslims.

As a student who has studied and lived in both countries, from my point of view I can say that both countries are on the one hand very similar and on the other very different. First of all, it is important to say that in both countries the education systems are separated from political, legal, social and other interests, in the education system the focus is on education, not on individuals. Regarding the differences and similarities in the field of media, I can say from work experience in Austria, that spreading hatred and promoting violence on social networks, in general towards any religion and nation, is severely punished. As for Slovenia, which is also legally regulated, any discrimination on the basis of religion, origin, skin color and race, is contrary to the Constitution of Slovenia, which present the highest legal act. So, both countries are legally regulated. The problem arises when the wrong things, such as tolerating Islamophobia or even inducing Islamophobic acts, come from the people in power. People who are involved in politics or are employed in public administration, they must perform their work independently within and on the basis of the Constitution, laws and other regulations and according to the rules of the profession. Here is a link, which indicates the knowledge we gained as students during our studies, that every work, including work on the Diploma Thesis, must be done impartially and without the influence of personal interests. For me personally, it was very challenging to remain neutral, because as a person belonging to the Muslim community, it would be easy to just blame all people for not understanding Islam, instead of trying to explain Islam as a simple religion advocating peace, freedom, understanding and moderation, and with that try to encourage people to educate themselves about Islam first, before making any other judgment.

As a conclusion, based on all evidence we presented in the thesis, we can say that both countries had an anti-Islamic stance, especially during the elections, and used similar policies to achieve their goals. Which tells us that anti-Islamic and anti-migration policies are the ones that have led to an increase in Islamophobia in both countries.

8 CONCLUSION

One of the aims of the thesis was to bring people closer to the real picture of Islam and their beliefs. We wanted to show that it is not a religion that advocates violence, coercion, and the killing of innocent people. Only the misunderstanding of religion has led to Islamophobia in many European countries, including Austria and Slovenia. Our goal was to show whether the media had an impact on increasing the rate of Islamophobia in the countries. Reflecting on our data, we can clearly say that the media have a huge impact, generally on society, but when it comes to certain topics, such as Islamophobia, data shows that in both countries there are media with a high rate of discrimination and hatred towards Muslims. The media were used in a way to produce fear and rejection of Muslims by society in both countries. In order to show the general influence of the media, especially on the rate of Islamophobia, we presented the role of the media during the elections and came to the results that the media are actually one of the key factors in succeeding of political parties and in increasing Islamophobia in countries. Thus, the Austrian media were the main source of information and coverage of political campaigns, which advocated the fight against so-called political Islam, and thus presented their campaign as an ideal protector of citizens in the fight against Islam. Unfortunately, data on media consumption display the huge public interest which indicates that the media have not only succeeded in attracting viewers but have also succeeded in their ultimate goal, influencing society to vote for parties that support anti-Islamic acts. In the case of Slovenia, we have the same scenario, where right-wing political party owns certain media and use them especially in time of elections to promote their right-wing policy of anti-migrations and anti-Islamic aims. Even though we do not have data about media consumption in this case, still media have succeeded to influence society to vote for the party that advocates anti-migration policy.

Based on all the research used on the impact of the media on Islamophobia in Austria and Slovenia we can confirm the first hypothesis.

We confirm the hypothesis based on statistic data of media consumption during the elections. From data it is evident that the media succeeded to attract public interest during elections particularly, displaying Islamophobic content in order to achieve the victory of their parties. Fight against Islam and migrations were the main policies of both countries during elections, adding oil to the fire in countries with already existed the high rate of Islamophobia.

We disconfirm the second hypothesis because emerge of Islamophobias did not appear with first generations of immigrated Muslims, but with accumulated series of hate crime, discrimination, and vilification towards Muslims over the years. The main reason for not

accepting Islam is not understanding Islam and their beliefs, which leading to appear of Islamophobia.

As a recommendation for future work, we would state, as one of the essential things in the future, is the awareness of young educated people. How to attract young people to get involved in politics, to get involved in the public sector, and thus “refresh” the political world in Europe. Young people have objective opinions, and their representation reaches beyond the borders of the state and views Europe as a whole, which leads to easier and more open work of EU law monitoring.

Also, one of the proposals not only as a reference but as a necessary thing in the political world is the legal regulation of pre-election announcements. Advertising using disloyal information, misleading advertising, and unrecognized or covert advertising can be very dangerous especially in times of the elections. When we say very dangerous, we mean misinformation circulating in the media during the election campaign, due to which people are unable to recognize whether they are true or not, which leads to a change in the opinion of individual political campaigns, and ultimately leads to the victory of certain political parties. The Law on Legal Regulation of Pre-Election Announcements would regulate the transparency and accuracy of such announcements.

We hope that we manage with this diploma to clarify misconceptions about Islam and slightly reduce the rate of Islamophobia in the future.

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