Razmerje med objektivnimi in subjektivnimi elementi odškodninske odgovornosti države po 26. členu Ustave

Gantar, Jan (avtor), Pirnat, Rajko (mentor)

Pri obravnavi odškodninske odgovornosti države se pojavijo nekatere izhodiščne dileme. O vprašanju, ali je treba navedeno področje umestiti v sfero javnega ali zasebnega prava, obstojijo nasprotujoča si mnenja. Zaradi pomanjkanja posebnega zakona o odškodninski odgovornosti države si sodišča pri obravnavi življenjskih primerov pomagajo z analogno uporabo splošnih pravil civilnega prava. Odpira se vprašanje, ali pravila civilnega prava zadoščajo za presojo odgovornosti države, oziroma ali jih je treba v nekaterih položajih prilagoditi vsebini ustavne določbe. Če sprejmemo stališče, da narava odgovornosti države odstopa od narave odgovornosti zasebnopravnih subjektov, se lahko pojavi zadrega pri utemeljevanju, kaj naj to pomeni pri obravnavi konkretnih primerov. Po prevladujočem stališču se ustavna določba uporablja le v tistih razmerjih, v katerih država nasproti posameznikom ravna kot organ oblasti. Po drugi strani, kadar država v razmerja s posamezniki vstopa kot subjekt ex iure gestionis, se zdi, da je takšna razmerja težko umestiti v okvir 26. člena Ustave. V prvem delu prispevka so obravnavane navedene izhodiščne dileme. Sledi obravnava predpostavk odškodninske odgovornosti države po 26. členu Ustave. Pri tem je nakazano, da je na vprašanje, ali je odškodninska odgovornost države objektivna ali krivdna, težko podati povsem zanesljiv odgovor. Drugi del prispevka je usmerjen v analizo konkretnih sodnih zadev. Rdeča nit je podana v preizkušanju teze o prepletanju elementov protipravnosti in krivde. Mestoma so navedena napotila na uvodna poglavja, saj so mnoga vprašanja med seboj tesno povezana. V vsaki izmed treh podrobneje obravnavanih zadev je prikazan poseben vidik. Pester spekter položajev odškodninske odgovornosti države, ki med seboj niso povsem primerljivi, kaže na to, da je na tem področju sprejemanje splošno veljavnih mnenj in ugotovitev nehvaležna naloga. Zato se do vprašanja o dokaznem bremenu, ki je pomembno povezano z elementoma protipravnosti in krivde, ne opredelim izrecno. V zvezi s tem vprašanjem namesto sklepa ponudim nekaj iztočnic za nadaljnje razmišljanje.

• Jezik: Slovenski jezik
• Ključne besede: ustavna določba, izvrševanje oblasti, posebna narava, pravila civilnega prava, predpostavke, objektivni koncept, krivdni koncept, objektivizacija, teza o prepletanju, dokazno breme
• Vrsta gradiva: Magistrsko delo/naloga
• Organizacija: PF - Pravna fakulteta
• Leto izida: 2017
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-95047
• COBISS.SI-ID: 15778897
• Datum objave v RUL: 13.09.2017

Sekundarni jezik

• Jezik: Angleški jezik
• Naslov: The relation between objective and subjective elements of the State's liability for damages under Article 26 of the Constitution

Izvleček

Some basic dilemmas arise when dealing with the State's liability for damages. There are conflicting opinions regarding the question whether the said area should be placed in the sphere of public or private law. Due to the lack of a special law on State's liability for damages, the courts tend to apply the general rules of civil law analogously. The question arises as to whether the rules of civil law are sufficient or whether they have to be adapted to the content of the constitutional provision. If we take the view that the nature of the responsibility of the state deviates from the nature of the responsibility of private law entities, it may be demanding to justify what this means in dealing with concrete cases. According to a dominant position, Article 26 of the Constitution applies only in those relations in which the state acts as an authority. On the other hand, when the state enters into relations with individuals as an entity ex iure gestionis, it seems that such relationships are difficult to place within the scope of the constitutional provision. The first part of the paper deals with the underlying dilemmas. This is followed by consideration of the conditions of the State's liability for damages under Article 26 of the Constitution. It is indicated that it is difficult to give a reliable answer to the question of whether the element of guilt is a necessary condition when assessing the State's liability for damages. The second part of the paper focuses on the analysis of specific court cases. The red thread is given in the examination of the thesis, according to which the elements of unlawfulness and guilt are closely interlinked. Since many issues are closely connected often there is a reference to the introductory chapters. Three cases from the case-law are presented in depth. Each of them has a special aspect. Examples of State liability for damages vary considerably. Therefore, in this area, the adoption of generally valid opinions and conclusions is an ungrateful task. I do not explicitly take a stand on the issue of the burden of proof, which is significantly related to the dilemmas regarding the elements of unlawfulness and guilt. Instead, I offer some points for further reflection.

• Ključne besede: constitutional provision, enforcement of authority, special nature, rules of civil law, conditions, objective liability, fault liability, objectification, the thesis of intertwining, burden of proof