Following the abandonment of the model of the external affection of things, and thus of a subsequent connection between an external object and a representation, two fundamental questions arise: the question of the constitution of sensation [Empfindung] and the question of the genesis of the original unity of the understanding. The thesis shows that these two questions are not independent of one another but constitute two aspects of the same original act of the understanding, namely original representing. Sensation and unity appear within it as opposing poles that are constituted only through original delimitation.
Understanding and nature thus no longer appear as two terms that would have to be subsequently connected, but as two determinations of the same original constitutive structure of original delimitation. On this basis, the thesis argues that original understanding is the substrate of nature itself, while the original structure of nature is the substrate of understanding itself. Originally, the two are one and the same and are constituted through the same fundamental theorem of nature — polarity as such.
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