This thesis examines the concept of anxiety in the works of Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Albert Camus and explores how each author understands the individual's confrontation with freedom, finitude, and the question of meaning. The aim of the thesis is to provide a comparative analysis of their interpretations of anxiety and related existential experiences and to show how, despite starting from similar premises, they develop different philosophical responses to the human condition. Kierkegaard understands anxiety as the revelation of freedom and the condition for the possibility of sin, whose meaning is ultimately fulfilled in faith. Heidegger defines it as a fundamental mood in which thrownness, being- toward-death, and the possibility of authentic existence are disclosed. Camus replaces the concept of anxiety with the feeling of the absurd, which arises from the confrontation between the human longing for meaning and the indifference of the world, and responds to it through rebellion. The comparison reveals both continuity and significant differences in their understanding of human existence and of the ways in which its fundamental limitations may be confronted.
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