A full concession of legal capacity to animals would mean granting them the ability to hold rights and obligations. This ability is contained in the status of a legal subject. Currently, animals have the status of legal objects, as has been the case since the earliest formations of legal systems.
In accordance with the interest theory of rights and primarily due to their ability to feel pain, it would be possible to legitimately concede legal capacity to animals in part, meaning only granting them the possibility of holding rights. However, two significant issues would arise: one in the need to establish a threshold level of consciousness that an individual animal would need to reach in order to gain this partial concession of legal capacity, and one in the sheer number of animals that would consequently require legal representatives to actually enforce the rights granted to them.
Currently, animals are protected by law indirectly, via human legal interests. In order to legally recognize at least their own interests, if not rights, it would be necessary to first grant them the role of moral patients.
|